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I examine the impact of CEO overconfidence on the sentimental tones used by firms in the annual 
reports. Following Loughran & McDonald’s sentiment word list, the thesis investigates whether 
firms headed by overconfident CEOs tend to use more favorably or tend to avoid positive, strong, 
moderate, negative, uncertain, litigious, constraining and weak tones while filing 10-K reports. The 
thesis provides strong evidence of lesser instances of negative and strong tones in annual reports 
of the firms headed by overconfident CEOs and weak evidence of lesser instances of litigious 
tone. The thesis also provides strong evidence of firms headed by overconfident CEOs with higher 
levels of cash increasing the use of strong tone in annual reports, and more valued decreasing the 
use of litigious tone. Also, the results show weak evidence of firms headed by overconfident CEOs 
with higher capital expenditure increasing the use of negative tone and highly leveraged firms 
headed by overconfident CEOs decreasing the use of litigious tone. 
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In the span of the last two decades, there have been quite a few papers investigating managerial 
overconfidence and its effects on corporate finance policies. Textual analysis has also been a 
buzzword in this era and has been explored from a behavioral finance perspective. Motivated by 
the researches conducted by Huang et al. (2014) and Mayew & Venkatachalam (2012) that looked 
into managers’ use of language during earnings press releases, and their content and pitch of voice 
during discussion with analysts to investigate managers’ probable attempts to inform/mislead the 
investors and/or to render insights on firms’ future returns and performances; by Merrienboer 
(2016) that the impact of such tones matters more when the CEO is overconfident; and by 
Aghazadeh et al. (2018) who suggest that a higher level of disclosures might be associated with 
CEO overconfidence as perceived by the investors and overconfident managers may adopt an 
aggressive reporting style, in this study I link CEO overconfidence with tones of 10-K corporate 
filings . 
The findings suggest that firms headed by overconfident CEOs tend to avoid negative tone in their 
annual reports more than firms headed by non-overconfident CEOs. Firms head by such CEOs also 
refrain from using a strong tone in annual reports. Apart from this, I also observe weak evidence 
supporting a negative association between CEO overconfidence and use of litigious tone in 10-K 
filings.  
The contribution of this research is twofold. First, the study bridges corporate finance and 
behavioral finance. Overconfidence has been mostly investigated in terms of other corporate 
finance issues, such as – investment decisions, capital budgeting, cost of capital, etc. But I work 
with overconfidence from a behavioral finance perspective. Second, it contributes to the growing 
literature on textual analysis and its effects. Prior studies primarily examined annual report tones , 
primarily positive and negative tone, with market reaction. This is the first study involving annual 
report tones in an expanded range based on textual analysis with managerial psychological makeup, 
such as managerial overconfidence. Also, this research is the first to explain the reasons behind the 
influence of CEO overconfidence on the tone of the annual report based on prior literature.  
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CEO overconfidence stems from ‘better-than-average’ effect, explained in a psychology paper by 
Alicke et al. (1995). Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh (2012) defines an overconfident CEO as an 
individual posing an idea about herself/himself being better than (s)he really is, the criteria being 
ability, judgment, or prospect for a favorable outcome. Malmendier & Tate (2005) constructs the 
definition of overconfidence as such that overconfident CEOs overestimate future firm 
performance driven by their delusion of being in control of favorable outcomes, an extensive level 
of commitment to a positive outcome and vague criterion for comparing performance. In the 
process, they increase their exposure to firm-specific risk intentionally.  
Overconfidence is a widely discussed topic in concurrent finance literature. Although the term has 
a general negative vibe attached to it, literatures show both congenial as well as detrimental effects 
that come along with an overconfident CEO. Most prominent researchers on overconfidence, 
Malmendier & Tate (2005), argue that overconfident CEOs tend to overinvest when their firms 
have ample internal funds, but they underinvest when internal funds are scarce. Following the 
pecking order theory, overconfident CEOs prefer cash, followed by debt, over equity financing in 
the belief that investors won’t perceive the true value of their firms in accordance with their 
expectations. They even tend to finance projects internally which had been more feasible to finance 
externally. Overconfident CEOs indulge in significantly more M&A (Rovenpor, 1993). According 
to Malmendier & Tate (2008), their overpaying nature for targets during an acquisition deal often 
lead to suboptimal merger synergy. As a result, the stock market reacts more sensitively (in a 
negative manner) to the merger announcements made by an overconfident CEO.  
Because overconfident CEOs overestimate their capability of keeping a leash on the outcome and 
underestimate the probability of random events, their forecasts reflect an optimistic bias impacting 
the precision. Tied up in a situation to meet their initial forecasts, overconfident CEOs are more 
likely to be compelled to walk toward a slippery slope of financial misreporting that begins with 
an optimistic-but-unintentional forecast. Ahmed & Duellman (2012) find overconfident CEOs to 
take up aggressive accounting techniques such as earnings management more than their non-
overconfident counterparts. Being forced to reach to the level of their minor optimistic bias while 
reporting financial statements, overconfident CEOs are more likely to misstate financial reports 
and commit frauds, especially when they have a significant portion of in-the-money unexercised 
exercisable options (Efendi, Srivastava & Swanson, 2007; Schrand & Zechman, 2012). An 
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overconfident CEO faces more restrictive debt covenants in terms of investment, M&A activities, 
and refinancing, due to concerns with future realization. These restrictions loosen if the CEO has 
superior prior performance, transparency in financial reports and higher delivered profitabilit y. 
Thus, CEO overconfidence contributes to a suboptimal operating, investing, and financing business 
scenario increasing the business risk (Aghazadeh et al., 2018). 
In contrast, overconfidence can also be instrumental in reducing business risk. Overconfident CEOs 
possess innovational excellence. They are more likely to approve risky but innovative projects 
which allow them to tap into firms’ growth opportunities more efficiently (Hirshleifer et al., 2012) .  
Consequently, researchers have found overconfidence to be positively associated with a number of 
patents, citations per issued patents and R&D expense (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011). Slothouber 
(2010) denotes a positive relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm value.  
According to Druz (2015), managers reveal information regarding their firms, sometimes 
intentionally (tips) and sometimes unintentionally (tell). Huang et al. (2014) found substantial 
evidence that managers may misdirect or mislead investors through the tone they use during 
earnings press releases by using Loughran-McDonald’s positive and negative words from their 
word list. They associate an abnormal positive tone with lower earnings and cash flows up to three 
(3) years. The LM dictionary has been used in various literature to evaluate the tones reflected in 
mutual fund letters, IPO prospectuses, analyst reports, business documents, newspaper articles, and 
columns, etc. Mayew & Venkatachalam (2012) also associate positive words with higher returns 
and negative words with negative returns, indicating that the content and pitch of managers’ 
conference calls with analysts provide insight on future company performance. Feldman et al.  
(2010) show that a positive change in the tone of MD&A section triggers a positive reaction in the 
market. While Garcia (2013) shows the impact of newspaper sentiment on market returns, Dougal 
et al. (2012) associate a pessimistic tone in the newspapers about a firm affecting the next-day 
market return. Liu & McConnell (2013) conclude that cancellation of acquisitions is also probable 
contingent upon media attention toward that deal. Merrienboer (2016) suggests that the impact of 
information managers choose to reveal through tips or tells matter more when the CEO is 
overconfident. Previous literature shows how LM word list is associated with returns, trading 
volume, subsequent volatility of stock returns, earnings surprises, and also, material weakness and 
frauds. Many of the papers show how negative tone affects the market sentiment unfavorably. Sell-
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side analysts correct their forecasts downward when they address an excessive negative tone 
leading to tinier future earnings. Loughran & McDonald (2011) found that the use of more negative 
words leads to lower excess return.  
A higher proportion of litigious words used by the firms denotes stock return volatility as evident 
by literature findings. Using more negative words or more strong modal words is positively related 
to a material weakness in financial reporting. Negative and litigious tone also harms a firm’s 
reputation as concluded by Barakat et al. (2019), and the capital market participants penalize the 
firm as well, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries with an efficient capital market. Negative 
sentiment has a proportionate relationship with higher delisting probability, lower possibility of 
paying dividends, higher provision of loan loss and lower ROA. When managers use more 
uncertain or more strong/weak modal words, confusion is created among the analysts in their 
predictions and forecasts affecting the influence on the market negatively. Managers’ tones are 
associated with the company life cycle as well. According to Bakarich et al. (2017), a firm entering 
a declining stage will bear more negative words reflecting a downward growth potential as well as 
act more confidently via the use of more strong modal words as opposed to a firm not in its 
declining stage. Lopatta et al. (2014) find chances of firms having more negative and litigious 
words in their 10-K filings of violating FCPA, 1977 are probabilistically higher.  
To test how overconfident CEOs tend to use different categories of words, I analyze eight (8) 
categories of words following Loughran & McDonald’s word list of sentiments in their 10-X file 
summaries. I analyze the net positive, strong, moderate, negative, uncertain, litigious, constraining 
and weak tones in the 10-K filings by 3,118 firms over the 24 years from 1993 to 2016 to find their 
association with CEO overconfidence in anticipation that I will be able to portray which type of 
sentiments firms headed by overconfident CEOs tend to use more favorably when producing their 
annual reports. I remove total number of negation words, such as - ‘No,’ ‘Not,’ ‘None,’ ‘Neither,’ 
‘Never,’ ‘Nobody’ etc., appearing within proximity of four or less words of a positive word in a 
sentence from the total number of positive words since use of such negation tone alongside a 
positive tone changes the meaning from positive to negative entirely.  
Then I proceed to measure overconfidence. My research builds upon the definition of 
overconfidence being the intentional exposure of the CEOs to the firm-specific risk of their firms. 
Since there are quite a lot of methods to measure overconfidence as used in various previous 
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literature, and not one of them is proven to be better than the other, I measure overconfidence in 
two ways and then take the 1st principal component of those two to reflect a weighted index. The 
first approach I follow is Malmendier & Tate (2005)’s “Holder67” approach in terms of CEOs’ 
unexercised exercisable call options. Malmendier & Tate argue a CEO to be overconfident if during 
the first five (5) years as the CEO, (s)he has the options 67% in-the-money at least twice but does 
not exercise. The rationale is that, when the options are in-the-money, the market price is higher 
than the strike price for call options, and a rational CEO is supposed to exercise her/his options in 
this favorable scenario. Instead, an overconfident CEO refrains from exercising the options because 
(s)he has a belief in the firm’s prospect and intends to exercise at a later point of time when the 
market price is even higher. Following Aghazadeh et al. (2018), as a typical CEO does not vary 
her/his behavior over time and instead shows a persistent exercise behavior as implied by 
Malmendier & Tate (2005) and Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh (2012), I tweak the Holder67 approach a 
bit to form the confident67 variable. Instead of calling a CEO overconfident if their options are 
67% in-the-money at least twice during the first five (5) years and does not exercise the option, I 
call a CEO overconfidence from the first time after the vesting period her/his options are 67% in-
the-money and (s)he does not exercise the options.  I define a CEO to be overconfident if (s)he 
holds more unexercised exercisable options than the industry median in the second approach 
following Aghazadeh et al. (optdelay).  
Using the eight (8) dependent variables and the overconfidence measure, 1st principal component 
of confident67 and optdelay, I run a fixed-effects regression model controlling for year and firm 
fixed effects with cluster robust standard error to conclude on the research question. Since, 
overconfident CEOs think they are better in terms of ability and judgment as explained by better-
than-average effect, I hypothesize that the tones reflecting a positive environment from Loughran-
McDonald’s dictionary may be more favorably used by the overconfident CEOs and the tones 
reflecting a negative environment may be generally avoided because overconfident CEOs would 
rationally want to portray and convey their belief of future prospect to the stakeholders as well. I 
include variables representing CEOs’ personal traits as well as firms’ characteristics following 
previous studies, such as Phua et al. (2018), Muslu et al. (2015), Li (2008), Aghazadeh et al. (2018) 
and Malmendier & Tate (2008), as the control variables. Since overconfidence is a behavioral trait 
of the CEOs, I understand the potential endogeneity issues. I address these issues by adding on 
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additional CEO characteristic variables as well as using year and firm fixed effects to address CEO-
specific and firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity. 
Prior literature can be instrumental to possibly explain the findings from the multivariate regression 
results. Malmendier & Tate (2005) explain why overconfident CEOs also follow pecking order for 
capital budgeting decisions. They prefer internal funds, and between debt and equity of external 
funds, they prefer debt over equity since they believe the investors won’t perceive the potential and 
value of their firms as they do. Although there’s contrasting evidence, literature found 
overconfident CEOs to face a higher cost of debt as the creditors are concerned about future 
realization of their money, more so for overconfident CEOs. Bondholders recognize the 
implications of overconfidence. They tighten the debt covenants for overconfident CEOs to restrict 
their investing, merger, and refinancing activities. These restrictions are tamed down if the CEOs 
behold superior prior performance, transparency in financial reports, and higher delivered 
profitability, which restraining the optimism by overconfident CEOs can help achieve more 
efficiently. Consequently, since overconfident CEOs prefer debt, they have the incentive to curb 
their level of overconfidence and portray moderation in their behavior as found from the results. 
Aghzadeh et al. (2018) showed a moderate level of overconfidence being optimal in terms of cost 
of equity as well. Malmendier & Tate argued that overconfidence matters more in equity-dependent 
firms. So, for an equity-dependent firm, a tamed down level of overconfidence is more significant 
by means of lower cost of equity. So, overall, exercising a moderate level of overconfidence is in 
the best interest of the overconfident CEOs when it comes to the cost of capital. A lower cost of 
capital leads to a higher firm value, which is ideally very important to a rational CEO. Since they 
have their unexercised exercisable options tied to the firm value, it’s in their personal interest as 
well when an increased firm value increases the value of those options.  
Literature provides evidence of investors reacting negatively to CEO overconfidence. They 
respond more negatively to a merger announcement by an overconfident CEO and the annual 
reports of the firms headed by overconfident CEOs. Sell-side analysts seem to revise their forecast 
downward if there’s a negative tone portrayed. By virtue of a positive reaction in the market 
environment resulted in by a moderate level of overconfidence and avoidance of negative tone in 
annual reports as explained earlier, overconfident CEOs will be able to attract more targets for 
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M&A as they seem to be active in the M&A market as a resultant characteristic of their 
overconfidence, as well as investors.  
Prior studies have shown CEO overconfidence to be positively associated with misstating financial 
reports. They start from a position where these misstatements are not intentional and geared more 
towards an optimistic bias. But eventually, to match up to their optimism, they might be in a 
position to intentionally misstate. Some short-term benefits may derive from these misstatements. 
But they put the CEOs at odds with long-term stock and bondholders. Restatement announcements 
have been seen to cause loss in market capitalization and substantially reduced public confidence. 
A moderation in overconfidence eradicates all these potential issues. 
Aside from a negative tone, literature also reveals why overconfident CEOs may choose to avoid 
a strong tone. The market reacts to the use of more strong modal words with a confused state as if 
uncertainty has risen due to the disparity in different analysts’ predictions (Druz, 2015). When a 
firm uses a strong tone, analysts differ in their interpretations and thus in their predictions and 
forecasts. When there are mismatches in analysts’ evaluations, the market reacts negatively even 
though the CEOs display confidence through the use of more strong modal words. A firm in its 
entering phase into the declining stage of the business life cycle acts more ambiguous and confident 
through the use of a more negative, uncertain, weak or strong tone (Bakarich et al., 2017). A 
declining phase affects the firm value negatively because of the relationship of the business life 
cycle with accounting information, investment, financing, cash policy, risk-seeking/averting 
behavior and extent of analyst-following. To portray upside growth potential, an overconfident 
CEO has reason to avoid negative and strong tone in their 10-K filings. Lopatta et al. (2014) find 
firms using more negative and litigious words in their financial disclosures having a higher 
probability of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 1977. Litigious words in annual 
reports also hamper the reputation of the firm. In short, avoiding negative, litigious as well as strong 
tone in their annual reports has incentives for overconfident CEOs. 
In order to find some alternative explanations as to the sensitivity of negative, strong and litigious 
tone to CEO overconfidence, I investigate the heterogeneous nature of these significant dependent 
variables across the higher and lower level of some CEO- and firm-specific characteristics from 
our research model. I create dummy variable based on the median value of the variables. I find 
strong evidence of firms headed by overconfident CEOs with higher levels of cash using more 
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strong tone in annual reports, and more valued firms (measured by market to book value) using 
lesser litigious tone. I also find weak evidence of firms headed by overconfident CEOs with higher 
capital expenditure using more negative tone and highly leveraged firms headed by overconfident 
CEOs using lesser litigious tone. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the previous literature on 
overconfidence and the use of different tones in various business documents as well as how the 
market reacts to them. Chapter 3 describes the data I used alongside the methodology. Chapter 4 
summarizes the results and findings, while Chapter 5 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
CEO overconfidence, in a broader term, managerial overconfidence, is an aspect of behavioral 
finance that reflects “the tendency of individuals to think that they are better than they are in terms 
of characteristics such as ability, judgment, or prospects for successful life outcomes” (Hirshleifer, 
Low, & Teoh, 2012).  
Malmendier & Tate (2005) build their definition of overconfidence that overconfident CEOs tend 
to overestimate the future performance of the company based on the ‘better-than-average’ effect, 
as explained in Alicke et al. (1995). Three (3) main factors – delusion of being in control, an 
extensive level of commitment to a positive outcome, and vague parameters for comparison of 
performance – basically leads to overconfidence (Malmendier & Tate, 2005). In other words, CEO 
overconfidence is the intentional exposure of the CEOs to the idiosyncratic risk of the firm.  
The word ‘overconfidence’ in general has a negative vibe attached to it. But is overconfidence a 
bad trait to possess for the top management? How do investors perceive overconfidence in top 
management? Previous literature point in both directions. 
On one hand, firstly, overinvestment is attributed to CEO overconfidence. Malmendier & Tate 
(2005) demonstrate the overinvesting nature of overconfident CEOs when internal funds are not 
scarce. They even finance feasible projects internally while they should have been financed 
externally instead. The frequency of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are more prevalent when the 
CEOs are overconfident. And also, an increased number of M&As generating subpar, or even no 
merger synergy results from CEO overconfidence (Billett & Qian, 2008). Malmendier & Tate 
(2008) further conclude that overconfident CEOs overpay merger premiums. Several prior 
empirical studies, not only limited to the aforementioned ones but also including Heaton (2002), 
Benson & Ziedonis (2010), Shu et al. (2013), thus believe CEO overconfidence leads to suboptimal 
operating, investing and financing decisions which eventually result in increased business risk 
(Aghazadeh, Sun, Wang, & Yang, 2018).  
On the other hand, investors may have reasons to believe that CEO overconfidence leads to 
decreased business risk and will turn out to be instrumental to an organization’s betterment in the 
10 
sense that overconfident CEOs are more likely to consider taking on riskier or innovative projects. 
They might as well be willing to allocate budgets to investigate the feasibility of these sort of 
precarious investment projects (Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012). Galasso & Simcoe (2011) show 
that overconfidence is positively related to a number of patents, research, and development (R&D) 
expenses and citations per issued patent. The perception of effort and innovational excellence 
among investors will, therefore, derive a reduced level of business risk. 
From a forecasting point of view, an overconfident CEO is likely to reflect an optimistic bias in 
her/his forecasts. Because (s)he overrates her/his ability to control the outcomes and/or 
underestimates the probability of random events, CEO overconfidence results in an overestimation 
of forecasts by affecting the forecast decisions. CEO overconfidence effects even forecast precision 
as well. An overconfident CEO is more likely to make forecasts with a shrunk range i.e. narrower 
width with respect to range forecasts. They even go with point estimates sometimes, which restrains 
the accuracy of forecasts to a great deal (Hribar & Yang, 2010). 
Under an imperfect contract setup, an overconfident manager destroys corporate value while 
making in-house capital budgeting decisions. Ben-David, Graham & Harvey (2013) find that 
managerial overconfidence leads to overinvestment. Heaton (2002) present a reasonable 
explanation for this alleged overinvestment argument. Since overconfident managers 
underestimate a project’s volatility and believe that their predictions are mostly accurate, they 
perceive negative NPV projects as positive NPV projects. Simon & Houghton (2003), using field 
study methodology, find evidence that overconfident managers are more likely to endorse pioneer 
products that later on receive a lukewarm response. Malmendier & Tate (2005) conclude that 
overconfident managers’ overinvestment level is positively related to the level of financial slack. 
Higher the financial slack, higher will be the value destroyed through overinvestment in capital 
budgeting decisions. They tend to overinvest for a project when they have abundant internal funds 
but at the same time trim down their investment when they have to take resort to external funds. 
When external financing is required, overconfident CEOs prefer debts over equity, second to cash, 
maintaining a pecking order. Because they overestimate the prospect and value of their companies, 
they believe that the market participants would not similarly view their firms and hence undervalue.  
Before Richard Roll, academicians have attributed M&A to either synergy or agency (personal 
diversification, building empire, entrenchment, etc.) motive. Roll (1986) concluded for the first 
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time that overinvestment in mergers and acquisitions and subsequent value destruction could 
simply be attributed to managers’ bias/hubris/overconfidence.  
Malmendier & Tate (2008) show that overconfident CEOs have, on average, 65% higher possibilit y 
of making a value-destroying acquisition. Stock manager participants also react far more 
sensitively to M&A announcement by overconfident managers (Doukas & Petmezas, 2007). 
Further researches show a positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and number 
of completed M&A deal (Rovenpor, 1993) and also the number of M&A offers (Ferris, Jayaraman, 
& Sabherwal, 2013). Although they take on more M&A deals, they also take on a greater number 
of subpar M&A deals by overpaying for targets who do not warrant for that premium resulting in 
poor M&A synergy. Also, overconfident CEOs are more likely to close M&A deals quickly 
(Doukas & Petmezas, 2007). Overconfident CEOs are more likely to pursue diversifying 
acquisitions (Brown & Sarma, 2007) and are more likely to offer cash to finance the deal (Ferris, 
Jayaraman, & Sabherwal, 2013). 
Since overconfident managers overestimate future returns, they might delay recognition of losses 
(Hribar & Yang, 2010). To meet or beat their optimistic forecasts, overconfident CEOs might be 
in a position that compels them toward aggressive accounting techniques such as greater earnings 
management (Ahmed & Duellman, 2012). Efendi, Srivastava, & Swanson (2007) find when CEOs 
have a sizeable quantity of in-the-money unexercised exercisable options, the probability of them 
misstating a financial report increases. They are more likely to walk down the slippery path of 
financial fraud, beginning with an optimistically biased but unintentional misstatement. It then 
grows bigger with intentional but very minor misstatement, believing that they will be able to cover 
that up with future earnings pretty soon because of their overestimating nature of future returns. 
Eventually, failing to catch up with their initial level of forecast, they are forced to commit 
fraudulent financial activities. Schrand & Zechman (2012) analyze 49 firms and find approximately 
one-fourth of them to involve themselves in misstatements of financial reports that satisfy the legal 
definition of intent. Although the rest of them were unintentional, they bear the potential to head 
toward the same road being compelled later on. 
In terms of market reaction, capital market investors react negatively if an overconfident CEO 
heads a firm. The underlying cause behind this negativity is the tendency of overconfident CEOs 
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to overestimate financial numbers based on their excessive optimism (Merrienboer, 2016). He 
measures this negative effect based on cumulative abnormal return (CAR).  
The bond market penalizes an overconfident CEO with more restrictive debt covenants. Sunder, 
Sunder & Tan (2010) suggest that the creditors in the market are aware of the detrimental 
implications of overconfidence. Because they are concerned with the future realization of the loans 
they extend, they monitor the activities of overconfident CEOs by containing their investing, M&A, 
and refinancing activities. In comparison to non-overconfident CEOs, overconfident CEOs face 
7.1% tighter restrictions for investment activities and 15.8% more for M&A activities. By also 
limiting overconfident CEOs’ ability to raise further debt in the future, they indirectly impact 
investing and M&A decisions as well. The restrictive covenants loosen up when the CEOs have 
displayed superior prior performance, inclination toward transparency in financial reports and 
higher delivered profitability coupled with firms’ higher growth and investment potential.  
To focus more on the congenialities of overconfidence, as measured by R&D expenditure, 
overconfident CEOs lead their companies to a heightened position in terms of innovation. They are 
apter in tapping the growth opportunities of their firms in innovative industries (Hirshleifer, Low, 
& Teoh, 2012). Slothouber (2010) finds a positive relationship between CEO overconfidence and 
firm value as measured by modified Tobin’s Q (market value to book value of assets). 
Overconfident CEOs enjoy a lower cost of debt, which helps to explain Malmendier & Tate’s 
(2005) finding that overconfident CEOs are less likely to issue equity (30 cents more debt for every 
$1 of equity) supporting the pecking order theory. Chen, Ho, Lin & Yen (2016) study how banks 
react to overconfidence in CEOs concerning issuing loans to them. They find that banks prefer 
overconfident CEOs and incentivize them by offering lower loan rates and higher approval rates 
keeping in mind their upside potential since they bring them more business. There are contrasting 
papers as well, which show that the cost of debt for overconfident CEOs is higher than their non-
overconfident counterparts. Overconfident CEOs are more interested in short term loans up to 3 
years, more so if the maturity period is up to 1 year. There is evidence, as found by Huang, Tan & 
Faff (2015) that creditors are more reluctant to offer long term loans to firms headed by 
overconfident CEOs. Aghazadeh, Sun, Wang & Yang (2018) conclude that the benefits of CEO 
overconfidence are optimal when the extent of overconfidence is moderate; their test shows a 
moderate level of overconfidence resulting in the lowest cost of equity. In their words, the benefits 
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of overconfidence erode with an extreme level of overconfidence being dominated by the 
detrimental effects of overconfidence.  
Malmendier & Tate (2005) counter some of the alternative explanations that may arise while trying 
to explain or dealing with the effects of overconfidence. People may casually associate 
overconfidence with either insider information or signaling or lesser degree of risk aversion or 
deferral of taxes or even procrastination.  
Malmendier & Tate (2005) argue that if insider information had been the reason why CEOs exhibit 
an overconfident behavior, the CEOs should have earned a positive abnormal return in comparison 
to the return while they diversify their portfolio and choose not to increase idiosyncratic risk by 
emphasizing on a specific firm. They compare the returns from not exercising their options in the 
fifth year to the hypothetical returns if they invested in S&P500, and do not find any evidence to 
believe that the CEOs acted on insider information. 
It may occur that CEOs hold onto their exercisable options even if they are in-the-money to signal 
the investors of a positive and favorable prospect of the firms. However, Malmendier & Tate (2005) 
discard this notion and argue that financial services companies and financial presses generally 
prioritize vesting and expiration times while following the transaction of insiders instead of option 
exercises for determination of future stock prices. 
Risk-seeking behavior of the CEOs can also be associated with overconfidence. What if the CEOs 
do not exercise and hold onto their options because they are characteristically less risk-averse and 
thus do not get affected due to under-diversification? Malmendier & Tate (2005) introduce a new 
measure for overconfidence, netbuyer, which denotes whether a CEO bought more shares than they 
sold during the first five (5) years, increasing their exposure to idiosyncratic risk even more on top 
of their overconfident trait. The introduction of this variable allowed them to explain that higher 
risk tolerance may intrigue CEOs to delay exercising their options, but they need to be risk-seeking 
on average by becoming a “net buyer”.  
Similarly, delaying exercising the options may be due to the intended deferral on payment of 
personal income taxes, but at the same time, it does not apply to additional stock purchases. Lastly, 
a CEO might portray inertia and keeps on holding to her/his exercisable options. But, if the 
argument holds, this reluctance on their portfolio should reflect on their corporate portfolio as well.  
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But Malmendier & Tate (2008) find that CEOs who hold their options till the last year they expire 
carries on significantly more merger and acquisition activities than their peers, a tendency which 
refutes their inertial nature. Also, Malmendier & Tate found those CEOs conducting other 
transactions on their portfolio even within two years to the expiration of the options.  
History of textual analysis lies way back in or around 1300 A.D. when members of the Dominican 
religious group created a concordance of Latin Vulgate to present a list of commonly used phrases. 
At the outset of the 19th century, even William Shakespeare’s works were evaluated following a 
textual analysis approach to examine whether they were written by Francis Bacon. During world 
wars, political speeches were dissected to find and investigate any pattern of carefully scripted 
rhetorical choices to interpret diplomatic trends. In the past few decades, the publication of 
significant literature from the Wall Street Journal in this area enhanced the statistical precision of 
textual analysis way more. The availability of news articles, earnings conferences, Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and opinionated writings in social media online in recent 
times triggered textual analysis to become an emerging area in the arena of Accounting and 
Finance.  
Initially in 2011, Loughran & McDonald created a dictionary of various types of words 
representing manifold sentiments consisting of six (6) major categories – positive, negative, 
uncertainty, litigious, strong modal, and weak modal. The exclusivity of their approach was the fit 
in a business context. For this, they analyzed the words used in 10-K filings from 1994 through 
2008. The dictionary contained 354 positive and 2,329 negative words. The upper hand of the LM 
dictionary is twofold – firstly, its extensiveness and comprehensiveness (no common positive or 
negative word is missing), and secondly, its orientation toward financial communication. Only the 
words used in 10-Ks by the managers were included in their dictionary. Later on, they expanded 
their listing of words to incorporate a couple more categories, such as – constraining and moderate 
modal. They also tweaked their algorithm to add the number of negation words, such as - No, Not, 
None, Neither, Never, Nobody etc., appearing within four or fewer words in a sentence of a positive 
word in the document. Then they calculate net positive words by deducting the number of negation 




For a better understanding, few examples are listed beneath from each category of words: 
Table 2.1: Examples of categories of words in the LM dictionary 
This table shows the examples of different categories of words Loughran & McDonald segregate their list 
of sentiments into. 
 
Positive Accomplish, Advantage, Honor, Popularity, Regain, Stabilize, Strong etc. 
Negative  Abandon, Bankruptcy, Bribe, Burden, Collapse, Malice, Scrutiny etc. 
Uncertainty Alternation, Anticipate, Deviate, Doubt, Likelihood, Reconsider etc.  
Litigious Abrogate, Absolve, Acquit, Appeal, Claim, Depose, Hereof etc. 
Constraining  Bound, Commit, Confine, Comply, Entail, Inhibit, Oblige etc.  
Strong modal Almost, Always, Clearly, Definitely, Must, Never, Undisputedly etc. 
Weak modal Apparently, May, Occasionally, Perhaps, Seldom, Sometimes etc.  
Moderate modal Can, Generally, Likely, Often, Tends, Usually, Would etc. 
To answer the ambiguity of whether managers misdirect and misinform investors by how they use 
the language in earning press releases, Huang, Teoh & Zhang (2014) figure out pretty strong 
evidence to substantiate this question. They use Loughran & McDonald’s (LM) positive and 
negative words on their sample from 1997 to 2007 and find that an abnormal positive tone is 
associated with subpar earnings and cash flows up to three (3) years after the initial release. Mayew 
& Venkatachalam (2012) utilize a sample of audio files from 2007 of the earnings conference calls 
to assess the positive and negative emotional states of the managers and regressed with concurrent 
stock returns. They were able to associate higher returns with LM positive words, and conversely, 
lower returns with LM negative words – which answers whether or not the content and the way 
managers pitch during conference calls with analysts indicate or to the least deliver some insight 
on future performance.  
Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat & Segal (2010) use positive and negative words from LM word list 
to evaluate the market’s response to changes in tones in the Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) sections of corporate filings. They factored in earnings surprises and accruals and found 
a positive correlation between high stock market return and positive change in tone. LM dictionary 
has also been used to assess the tone of mutual fund letters (Hillert, Niessen-Ruenzi, & Ruenzi, 
2014), Initial Public Offering (IPO) prospectus [ (Ferris, Hao, & Liao, 2013) and (Loughran & 
McDonald, 2013)] and analyst reports (Twedt & Rees, 2012).  
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Alongside business documents, newspaper articles/columns have also been analyzed using LM 
positive and negative words to assess market perception for investment. Dougal, Engelberg, Garcia 
& Parsons (2012) conclude that a pessimistic tone in the newspapers results in a more negative 
market return on the next day. Liu & McConnell (2013) state that media attention measured by a 
number of columns/articles appearing regarding an acquisition, as well as the tone used in those 
articles/columns can significantly influence the probability of cancellation of the acquisition deal. 
Even during times of recession, Garcia (2013) shows that newspaper sentiment plays a role in 
predicting future returns of the stocks. Not only in determining the future performance of the 
stocks, but media sentiment can also modify how investors look at building their portfolio. 
Solomon, Soltes & Sosyura (2014) argue that investors go after certain funds that have a track 
record of high returns only if those funds attain some level of media coverage.  
Besides using newspaper articles, past studies, such as Chen, De, Hu & Hwang (2014) also look at 
Seeking Alpha, a website intended to deliver financial analyses and news regarding the financial 
markets and their conditions, to find that tones used by analysts to express their opinions have an 
impact on future returns and earnings surprises. Solomon (2012) investigate the investor relations 
firms to see how they handle their clients’ media coverage. He figured that the firms emphasize on 
publicizing the good news relative to negative news to boost the media coverage. 
Druz (2015) suggests that managers, often intentionally or unintentionally, leak financial 
information with a hint to future returns based on the tone they use. Firms tend to reveal financial 
information with a positive tone, which could be even more significant for CEOs who are 
overconfident (Merrienboer, 2016). Researches find the relationship between LM word list and 
returns, trading volume, subsequent volatility of return, unexpected earnings, fraud, and material 
weakness.  Quite a few papers associate the negative tone with market sentiment. Druz (2015) 
shows how sell-side analysts lower their forecast for the subsequent quarter when the manager 
reflects an excessive negative tone. His results support such behavior by the analysts by showing 
that an excessive negative tone leads to smaller future earnings. Loughran & McDonald (2011) 
show that a higher proportion of negative words resonates with lower excess returns. Firms that 
use more litigious words face increased levels of stock return volatility. Increased use of negative 
words or strong modal words warrants a material weakness in internal accounting controls. 
Negative and litigious tones have an adverse impact on firm reputation as well. Barakat, Ashby, 
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Fenn, & Bryce (2019) investigate equity and debt-based reputational damages concerning negative 
and litigious tone and found conclusive evidence in favor. According to their study, capital market 
investors penalize firms when they use negative and litigious words during operational risk event 
announcements. These effects on reputation are even more significant for Anglo-Saxon countries 
such as the USA, UK, Canada, etc. where market-based economy due to efficient capital market 
prevails. On a sample of US banks, Gandhi, Loughran & McDonald (2018) associate negative 
sentiment in annual reports with higher delisting probability, lower possibility of paying dividends 
in subsequent period, higher provision of loan loss in the subsequent period and lower return on 
asset in future. There is a reason why managers are more concerned with negative tone than positive 
tone. Avoidance of negative tone affects the reaction of market participants more favorably than 
taking resort to a positive tone. When the managers use more uncertain words or more strong modal 
words or weaker modal words, there occurs a disparity among the analysts with their predictions, 
which can create confusion in the market (Druz, 2015). Tones used by managers play a significant 
role in the portrayal of firms’ upside growth potential reflected by the company life cycle. Bakarich, 
Hossain, Hossain & Weintrop (2017) argue that a firm about to enter the declining phase of its 
business life cycle tends to be more ambiguous and more confident in its tone. In contrast, firms 
that are not in a decline stage do the opposite. This argument is important since various stages of a 
company’s life cycle have been shown to affect the firm value in terms of accounting information, 
investment, financing, cash policy, risk-seeking/averting behavior and extent of analyst-follow ing 
due to change in firm’s internal environment. Forming the sentiment variables with uncertain tone, 
weak tone, and strong tone, they show that a firm in decline stage uses more strong modal words 
to display confidence. These firms have a more negative tone as well in their 10-K filings. Lopatta, 
Jaeschke & Yi (2014) find that firms with more negative and litigious words in their financial 
disclosures have a higher probability of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 1977.  
The question may arise whether evaluating the Management Discussing and Analysis (MD&A) 
section of a 10-K filing would have been a more focused analysis of the tones used by overconfident 
CEOs. I shift my focus on the whole 10-k filing because MD&A section does not help to examine 
the tones in a clearer manner, as shown by Loughran & McDonald (2011). They showed that only 
the MD&A section does not produce any noticeable impact on excess returns in comparison to 10-
K filings (Loughran & McDonald, 2011, p. 36). 
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Apropos of the literatures reviewed, I can clearly state that the tones used by personnel in a 
managerial position in an organization at major points of time, such as – MD&A sections in 
corporate filings, earnings releases, mutual fund letters, telephone conversations to analysts, etc., 
affect market sentiment, which eventually affects market returns. The tones also play a role in 
forming clientele relations, guiding media attention, and henceforth media coverage. Even the 
articles/columns published in the newspapers/websites or other print media direct the market 
returns. There is hardly any doubt among the researchers who explored this area of textual analysis 
and investigated its association with market returns that a positive vibe from the managerial 
position triggers a positive result even when controlled for earning surprises, and similarly, a 
negative vibe leads to a negative market return. 
Eventually, the researches by Huang, Teoh & Zhang (2014) and Mayew & Venkatachalam (2012) 
that look into managers’ use of language during earnings press releases and their content and pitch 
of voice during discussion with analysts to investigate managers’ probable attempts to 
inform/mislead the investors and/or to render insights on firms’ future returns and performances 
inspired us to venture further into this area. The idea to associate managerial overconfidence, in 
specific, CEO overconfidence, with the sentiment analysis aspect of textual analysis came basically 
from Merrienboer (2016) who tells impact of these tones matter more when a firm is headed by an 
overconfident CEO and Aghazadeh, Sun, Wang & Yang (2018) who try to tell that a higher level 
of disclosures might be associated with CEO overconfidence as perceived by the investors and 
overconfident managers may adopt an aggressive reporting leading to subpar quality. Thus, I am 




DATA DESCRIPTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data Sources and Variable Description 
The sample comprises Loughran-McDonald’s 10-K file summaries from the year 1993 to 2016, 
which has been retrieved from Software Repository for Accounting and Finance of the University 
of Notre Dame. The sample period is restricted because of Loughran & McDonald’s compilation 
of tonal information for only these many years. Since I am interested in the tones reflected in the 
annual reports, I include only the 10-K filings and exclude the quarterly submissions from the 
companies. In case there is an amendment in the filing, later on, I get rid of the duplication. I do 
not exclude financial services and utility firms following other prior studies, not necessarily 
exploring a similar area of research, since I do not have reason to believe the regulatory nature and 
the generally high leveraged situation (for the financial serviced sector) will have an impact on the 
dependent variables, the tones of annual reports. I study 3,088 firms in my research.  
Table 3.1.1 entails the definitions and/or formula I use to construct the variables. The independent 
variables can be categorized into two (2) major segments – CEO characteristics and firm 
characteristics. The first set of variables takes into account different characteristics a CEO might 
have, such as – gender, age, and tenure with the company. The second set of variables consists of 
different characteristics that their firms may have – total assets, level of cash holdings, happenings 
of mergers and acquisitions, capital expenditure, firms’ age, beta and idiosyncratic volatility of the 
firms. I also incorporate a few firm-specific accounting ratios, such as – book value of leverage, 
market value to book value and return on asset inspired from previous studies. 
 
Table 3.1.1: Variable Description and Data Sources 
This table describes the variables used in the research design and their sources. 
 
Notation Variable Name Description Data Source 
netpositive Positive Tone Percentage of words in 10-K filing reflecting a 
positive tone  
Loughran and McDonald's 10X File Summaries, 
Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, 
University of Notre Dame 
strong Strong Tone Percentage of modal words in 10-K filing reflecting 
a strong tone  
Loughran and McDonald's 10X File Summaries, 
Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, 
University of Notre Dame 
moderate Moderate Tone Percentage of modal words in 10-K filing reflecting 
a moderate tone  
Loughran and McDonald's 10X File Summaries, 
Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, 
University of Notre Dame 
negative Negative Tone Percentage of words in 10-K filing reflecting a 
negative tone  
Loughran and McDonald's 10X File Summaries, 
Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, 
University of Notre Dame 
uncertain Uncertain Tone Percentage of words in 10-K filing reflecting an 
uncertain tone  
Loughran and McDonald's 10X File Summaries, 
Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, 
University of Notre Dame 
litigious Litigious Tone Percentage of words in 10-K filing reflecting a 
litigious tone  
Loughran and McDonald's 10X File Summaries, 
Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, 
University of Notre Dame 
constraining Constraining Tone Percentage of words in 10-K filing reflecting a 
constraining tone  
Loughran and McDonald's 10X File Summaries, 
Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, 
University of Notre Dame 
weak Weak Tone Percentage of modal words in 10-K filing reflecting 
a weak tone  
Loughran and McDonald's 10X File Summaries, 
Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, 
University of Notre Dame 
overconfidence 1st Principal 
Component 
1st principal component of the test variables, 
confident67 and optdelay 
- 
confident67 Holder 67 If a CEO has 67% in-the-money unexercised 
exercisable options, then confident67=1, otherwise 
zero 
S&P Execucomp Annual Compensation AND S&P 




optdelay Options Delay If a CEO has in-the-money unexercised exercisable 
options greater than the industry median, then 
optdelay=1, otherwise zero 
S&P Execucomp Annual Compensation AND S&P 
Execucomp Stock Options Grant - 1992 Format 
female Gender If the gender of the CEO is female, then female=1, 
otherwise zero 
S&P Execucomp Annual Compensation AND S&P 
Execucomp Stock Options Grant - 1992 Format 
age Age Age of the CEO  S&P Execucomp Annual Compensation AND S&P 
Execucomp Stock Options Grant - 1992 Format 
tenure Tenure Tenure in years the CEO has been with the firm S&P Execucomp Annual Compensation AND S&P 
Execucomp Stock Options Grant - 1992 Format 
logassets Firm Size Natural logarithm of one plus the total assets in USD 
millions of the firm 
Compustat - Capital IQ North America Annual 
Fundamentals Updates 
cash Cash Level Cash and short-term investments scaled by total 
assets in USD millions 
Compustat - Capital IQ North America Annual 
Fundamentals Updates 
ma M&A Occurrence Occurrence of merger and acquisition; ma=1 if 
acquisition expenditure is greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise 
Compustat - Capital IQ North America Annual 
Fundamentals Updates 
capex Capital Expenditure Capital expenditure scale by total assets in USD 
millions 
Compustat - Capital IQ North America Annual 
Fundamentals Updates 
firmage Firm's Age Difference between the panel year and the year of 
firm's first appearance in CRSP  
CRSP 
beta Beta Systematic risk  WRDS Beta Suite 
ivol Idiosyncratic Volatility Firm-specific/idiosyncratic risk WRDS Beta Suite 
leverage Book Value of 
Leverage 
Total long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, 
divided by total assets in USD millions  
Compustat - Capital IQ North America Annual 
Fundamentals Updates 
mvbv Market Value to Book 
Value 
Common shares outstanding multiplied by annual 
closing price, divided by common shares outstanding 
multiplied by book value per share 
Compustat - Capital IQ North America Annual 
Fundamentals Updates 
roa Return on Asset Operating income before depreciation, divided by 
total assets in USD millions 





Table 3.1.2: Variable Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of the primary dependent and independent variables. Total assets 
(firm size) in the variable has been measured by taking the natural logarithm of total assets.  
 
 
N MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX 
 
Tone Variables 
netpositive 33,010 0.635611 0.179752 -0.11074 2.283372  
strong 33,010 0.273928 0.104388 0 1.721012  
moderate 33,010 0.276343 0.082735 0    0.679331  
negative 33,010 1.590556 0.448306 0 4.654384  
uncertain 33,010 1.208738 0.342469 0 2.997502  
litigious 33,010 1.672472 0.870701 0 7.025741  
constraining 33,010 0.732769 0.19522 0 1.910828  
weak 33,010 0.487815 0.178229 0 1.706017  
      
 
Overconfidence Variables 
overconfidence 33,011 -5.93E-10 1.123571 -1.39965 1.429306  
confident67 33,011 0.503287 0.499997 0 1  
optdelay 33,011 0.486232 0.499818 0 1  
       
CEO Characteristic Variables 
female 33,011 0.022538 0.148427 0 1  
age 32,147 55.74396 7.333382 28 96  
tenure 33,011 11.30363 10.66172 0 61  
       
Firm-level Variables 
logassets 33,011 7.592953 1.693541 1.488851 11.19793  
cash 33,007 0.145913 0.170942 0.000302 0.916104  
ma 33,011 0.440914 0.496504 0 1  
capex 33,011 0.04761 0.053337 0 0.388874  
firmage 33,011 23.25658 18.49252 0 91  
beta 33,002 1.102942 0.644071 -2.33487 7.116969  
ivol 33,002 0.048929 0.029259 0.0054 0.4958  
leverage 33,011 0.215935 0.176831 0 0.961051  
mvbv 33,011 4.233684 52.82945 0.027701 6526.163  
roa 31,932 0.121868 0.11065 -1.37331 0.421687  
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3.1.1 Dependent Variables 
I take eight (8) dependent variables from Loughran-McDonald’s 10-K filings dataset to portray the 
tones used in annual reports – positive, negative, uncertain, litigious, constraining, strong modal, 
weak modal and moderate modal.  
I tweak the variable positive tone by deducting the number of negation words from the number of 
positive words and define them as a net positive tone following Loughran & McDonald. Negation 
words are words such as ‘No,’ ‘Not,’ ‘None,’ ‘Neither,’ ‘Never,’ ‘Nobody’ etc. Because these 
words being placed in proximity of a positive word change the meaning from positive to negative, 
it’s rational to modify the initial positive tone variable for greater accuracy. I scale the dependent 
variables by the number of total words to show the percentage of a certain variable in proportion 
to the total number of words in the filing.  
Table 3.1 presents the statistical properties of all the variables used in the study. The number of 
observations for each dependent variable is 33,010 found from 1993 to 2016. The mean, median 
and standard deviations are also noted in the table for each of the dependent variables along with 
the minimum and maximum values. The formulas used to calculate the dependent variables are 
such: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 = ( 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
 ) × 100…… … …… …… … …… …    (3.1.1.1) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒,𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 = ( 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
 ) × 100… … …… … …… … …… …… … ……     (3.1.1.2) 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 = ( 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
 ) × 100… …… …… … …… … …… … …  (3.1.1.3) 
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 = ( 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
 ) × 100… …… … …… … …… …… … …… … …   (3.1.1.4) 
𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 = ( 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
 ) × 100… … …… … …… … …… …… … ……    (3.1.1.5) 
𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 = ( 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
 ) × 100… … …… …… … …… … …… …… … …    (3.1.1.6) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 = ( 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
 ) × 100…… … …… … …… …… … …… (3.1.1.7) 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 = ( 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
 ) × 100… …… …… … …… … …… … …… …… …  (3.1.1.8) 
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3.1.2 Key Explanatory Variables 
To construct the overconfidence variable, I firstly take the resort of the most common approach to 
measure overconfidence following Malmendier & Tate (2005)’s holder67 approach with a little 
variation following Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh (2012). Instead of following Malmendier & Tate who 
define an overconfident CEO such that at least twice during the first five (5) years as CEO, (s)he 
does not exercise his/her call option while the option is 67% in-the-money, I call the CEO 
overconfident from the first time after the vesting period her/his options are 67% in-the-money and 
(s)he does not exercise the options, and assign the variable confident67 with a value of 1, or else 
zero. The rationale behind this modification is that overconfidence is a persistent trait (Hirshleifer, 
Low, & Teoh, 2012) and an overconfident CEO continues to portray overconfidence in his/her 
behavior over the time devoid of any deviation in actions. I extract necessary data from S&P 
Execucomp Annual Compensation database and S&P Execucomp Stock Option Grants – 1992 
Format database to construct this variable. Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Executive Compensation 
database provides time-series data since 1992 and it provides detailed information regarding 
executives’ salary, bonus, options, and stock awards, non-equity incentive plans, pensions and such 
by collecting the data directly from each company’s annual proxy (Form DEF14A SEC).  I filter 
the dataset to represent only CEOs and not other managerial positions. If for any firm, the CEO 
gets replaced during any year, I take the CEO at the year-end and remove the other CEO from the 
dataset.  
Secondly, I follow Aghazadeh, Sun, Wang & Yang (2018) and measure CEO overconfidence in 
terms of their possession of in-the-money options in comparison to the industry median. If in-the-
money options held by the CEO is greater than the median in-the-money options held by the CEOs 
in that industry, I categorize the CEO as overconfident as assign as the value of 1 to the variable 
optdelay, and otherwise zero. I use the data I retrieved from S&P Execucomp Annual 
Compensation database and S&P Execucomp Stock Option Grants – 1992 Format database for this 
purpose too.  
Since it has been established by Aghazadeh et al. (2018) that no overconfidence measure is 
necessarily better than the other because of the procedures being related but distinct, following 
their approach, I run a principal component factor analysis of these two constructed variables and 
use the first principal component (overconfidence) as the primary test variable. The objective of 
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creating the first principal component is to capture the variances between these two primary test 
variables to measure overconfidence. By using a linear combination (weighted averages), this 
method creates an optimal choice to measure the variables with optimal weights. For robustness, I 
show results using confident67 and optdelay as well.  
There are several methods to measure CEO overconfidence. The reasons why I choose to follow 
the options-based methodology of Malmendier & Tate (2005) are twofold. First, this method by 
Malemndier & Tate (2005) is a widely used approach to measure overconfidence and most of the 
papers that dealt with CEO overconfidence incorporated this process in their methodologies. 
Second, this options-based measure of overconfidence examines the behavior of the CEOs at their 
total discretion. An alternative approach could be the press-based (media publications in journals, 
articles, newspapers etc.) approach also introduced by Malmendier & Tate (2005) that reflects 
outsiders’ opinion about a CEO. Malmendier & Tate (2005) analyze the articles on a specific CEO 
in a specific year in popular publications such as The New York Times, Business Week, Financial 
Times, The Economist and The Wall Street Journal in search of words such as 
‘confident/confidence,’ ‘optimistic/optimism’ to attach these words to overconfident CEOs and 
words such as ‘reliable,’ ‘cautious,’ ‘conservative,’ ‘practical,’ ‘frugal’ or ‘steady’ to attach them 
with non-overconfident CEOs. However, given the scope of my research, this is something I could 
not have done because of the time restrictions and the tedious nature of generating the data. Since 
Malmendier & Tate (2005) find high correlation between the press-based measure and the measure 
they primarily followed, this should not be of much concern. 
 
3.1.3 Control Variables 
Following a few major papers conducted on overconfidence and on textual analysis in a broader 
term, I incorporate few independent variables in the study. 
CEO Characteristics: 
According to Malmendier, Tate & Yan (2011), various quantifiable traits of a CEO can 
significantly affect corporate decision making and hold explanatory power, especially when 
overconfidence is associated. Malmendier & Nagel (2011) also argue that age can, in some ways, 
mirror the CEO’s experience, and thus an older CEO, due to his experience, will tend to be more 
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overconfident. Henceforth, following Malmendier & Tate (2008), I incorporate the CEO’s age as 
a control variable in the study. While Fox, Lundenberg & Puncochar (1994) argue men and women 
vary in terms of the characteristics they bear, Shefrin (2005) establish that psychological difference 
between them can be reflected from their interpretations of things from an overconfidence point of 
view, which lead us to include the gender as a dummy variable in the regression. The variable takes 
a value of 1 if the CEO is female, and zero otherwise. Tenure can also measure experience in a 
better way, especially in the case of industry-specific experience (Cremers & Grinstein, 2009). But 
due to insufficient data in the dataset for the years an executive acted as a CEO leading to a 
significant loss of observations in the regression, I proxy with CEO’s overall tenure with the firm 
instead. All CEO characteristics data are extracted from the S&P Execucomp Annual 
Compensation database. 
Firm Characteristics:  
In order to construct firm-specific control variables I follow Malmendier & Tate (2005); 
Malmendier & Tate (2008); Li (2008); Muslu, Radhakrishnan, Subramanyam & Lim (2015); 
Boubakri & Mishra (2017); Phua, Tham & Wei (2018) and Aghazadeh, Sun, Wang & Yang (2018). 
Except for the betas and firm’s age, all other information is retrieved from Compustat – Capital IQ 
North American Annual Fundamentals Updates database. Beta and idiosyncratic volatility of the 
firms are taken from WRDS Beta Suite while firms’ age was calculated from CRSP data. Natural 
logarithm of one plus total asset in USD millions is taken to proxy for a firm’s size following quite 
a few previous studies. The sample is restricted based on total assets being greater than USD 1 
million. Cash and capital expenditure are scaled by total assets, the units being USD millions. To 
indicate an acquisition, I form a dummy variable ma which takes a value of 1 if the acquisition cost 
was greater than zero in any year, and otherwise zero. I incorporate three (3) accounting ratios in 
the control variables – book value of leverage, market value to book value and return on asset. I 
calculate the book value of leverage by dividing current liabilities added with long-term debt by 
total assets, the unit being USD millions. To calculate market value to book value, I first calculate 
the market value by multiplying a number of outstanding common shares with an annual closing 
price. Then I calculate the book value by multiplying common shares outstanding with book value 
per share. Finally, I divide the market value by the book value to find out the ratio. For return on 
assets, I divide the operating income before depreciation from the cash flow statement by total 
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assets, the unit being USD millions. Because it is a herculean job to find out the establishment 
years for this many firms, the proxy for a firm’s age by deducting their first appearance year on 
CRSP from the current year, which I found several other previous literature doing as well. Finally , 
I extract risk information from WRDS Beta Suite and add beta and idiosyncratic volatility of the 
firms in the list of control variables. I use a 52-weeks’ window to calculate the beta. All these 
datasets are match-merged using GVKEY and CUSIP as the company identifier.  
 
3.2 Research Design 
I undertake two approaches to test the research question. Firstly, I test the differences of means of 
the eight (8) tones I use as the dependent variables. The two groups I compare are overconfident 
CEOs and not-overconfident CEOs. Initially, I use overconfidence, the 1st principal component of 
confident67 and optdelay, as the key explanatory variable. For robustness, I also show the results 
using confident67 and optdelay separately as the key explanatory variable. If the means are 
different, I can conclude that overconfidence can be the sole factor responsible for causing 
differences in tones used in annual reports by the CEOs.  
My second approach is to run a fixed-effects (year and firm) multivariate regression where I use 
the dependent variables separately in a series of regressions with overconfidence as the major 
explanatory variable and add CEO and firm characteristics control variables. A multivariate 
analysis will allow us to control for the effects of CEOs’ traits and the characteristics of the firm 
and observe the impact of overconfidence on tones of annual report independent of CEO and firm 
characteristics. The regressions comprise two (2) dummy variables – female and ma. Later on, 
while testing for robustness, I replace overconfidence with confident67 and optdelay in turns, which 
are dummy variables as well portraying whether or not the CEO is overconfident. In the 
regressions, I take year and firm fixed effects, since I believe they will capture the variation in the 
panels over time and across firms.  
Following is the regression model I run of the dependent variables representing various tones in 
the annual reports on CEO overconfidence variable along with other control variables with the year 
and firm fixed effects using cluster-robust standard error:  
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𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽13𝑚𝑣𝑏𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 +∈𝑖,𝑡 .............................................................................................................. (3.2.1) 
CEO overconfidence is a behavioral trait. There could be concerns with potential endogeneity. The 
endogenous nature of various other CEO traits or due to CEO-firm matching could affect the 
interpretation of results I get. Being aware of this issue with observed CEO-specific omitted 
variables or unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity, from the very beginning of my analysis, I 
incorporate additional CEO characteristic variables and use year and firm fixed effects in 
anticipation that doing so will let us comment on the findings in a more appropriate way. Although 
according to Malmendier & Tate (2005), the results should not be affected because of issues with 
endogeneity since the stakeholders should be aware of the negative effects of overconfidence and 




RESULTS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Univariate Test Results 
4.1.1 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Table 4.1.1.1 presents the Pearson Correlation Matrix of the variables used in the study. From the 
table, I can see that two (2) measures of overconfidence – overconfidence, and optdelay are 
positively correlated with a net positive tone in a highly significant manner. So, I might expect that 
overconfident CEOs will tend to use more positive words in the annual reports. As for strong and 
moderate modal words, I can see that all three (3) overconfidence measures show a highly 
significant negative correlation with the dependent variable.  Henceforth, I might not be able to see 
a favorable result in terms of the hypotheses encompassing strong and moderate tones. The 
correlation table shows a highly significant negative association between negative tone and 
overconfidence.  Henceforth, it might appear in the results that overconfident CEOs tend to avoid 
negative words in the annual reports. While it comes to uncertainty words in the annual reports, 
the table portrays that overconfidence measures are negatively associated with it. So, I might see 
from the results later that when CEOs are overconfident, they refrain from using uncertain tone in 
the 10-K filings.  The correlation between overconfidence and litigious tones shows a positive sign 
which denotes that overconfident CEOs will prefer to use a more litigious tone. A very highly 
significant negative association of overconfidence with constraining and weak tone denote the 
overconfident CEOs to be negligent in using constraining and weak modal words in the annual 
report filings.  
From the magnitude of the correlations among the independent variables used in the study, as seen 
from the correlation matrix, I can tell that multicollinearity among the variables is not going to be 
an issue for the analysis part.  The signs of the correlations, along with the significance levels, tell 
how the variables are associated with each other if roughly investigated.  Later on, the multivariate 
regression results will tell the story in a precise manner. 
 
Table 4.1.1.1: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the correlations between all dependent and independent variables with the significance levels. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) netpositive 1.0000            
(2) strong 0.0883*** 1.0000           
(3) moderate 0.1900*** 0.0854*** 1.0000          
(4) negative  -0.0468*** 0.1408*** 0.2979*** 1.0000         
(5) uncertain 0.1896*** 0.0038 0.6759*** 0.3807*** 1.0000        
(6) litigious -0.3493*** 0.0094* -0.5618*** 0.1573*** -0.5724*** 1.0000       
 (7) constraining -0.2851*** 0.0380*** 0.0993*** 0.3790*** 0.1350*** 0.1991*** 1.0000      
(8) weak 0.0642*** 0.1425*** 0.4371*** 0.4390*** 0.6991*** -0.1518*** 0.2742*** 1.0000     
(9) overconfidence 0.0273*** -0.0668*** -0.1015*** -0.1296*** -0.0918*** 0.0514*** -0.1182*** -0.1342*** 1.0000    
(10) confident67 0.0068 -0.0620*** -0.1296*** -0.1301*** -0.1428*** 0.0736*** -0.1318*** -0.1911*** 0.7945*** 1.0000   
(11) optdelay 0.0366*** -0.0441*** -0.0317*** -0.0758*** -0.0030 0.0081 -0.0561*** -0.0222*** 0.7945*** 0.2624*** 1.0000  
(12) logassets 0.0037 -0.1294*** -0.0457*** 0.0492*** 0.0229*** 0.0706*** 0.0796*** -0.1087*** 0.2423*** 0.1681*** 0.2169*** 1.0000 
(13) female 0.0232*** 0.0079 0.0185*** 0.0229*** 0.0345*** -0.0350*** 0.0345*** 0.0389*** -0.0532*** -0.0573*** -0.0273*** -0.0181*** 
(14) age -0.0387*** -0.0776*** -0.0232*** -0.0629*** -0.0316*** -0.0034 -0.0224*** -0.0855*** 0.0782*** 0.1062*** 0.0181*** 0.1202*** 
(15) tenure -0.0133** -0.0760*** -0.0625*** -0.1476*** -0.0879*** -0.0074 -0.1257*** -0.0997*** 0.1710*** 0.1900*** 0.0818*** 0.0672*** 
(16) cash 0.1107*** 0.1748*** 0.1992*** 0.2174*** 0.2152*** -0.1042*** -0.0602*** 0.3241*** -0.0461*** -0.0647*** -0.0086 -0.3530*** 
(17) leverage -0.1250*** -0.0395*** -0.1425*** -0.1178*** -0.1388*** 0.0933*** 0.1468*** -0.1163*** -0.0077 -0.0226*** 0.0104* 0.2808*** 
(18) mvbv -0.0008 0.0022 -0.0072 0.0024 -0.0040 0.0105* -0.0008 0.0082 0.0133** 0.0026 0.0186*** -0.0156*** 
(19) ma 0.0314*** -0.0559*** -0.0593*** -0.0340*** 0.0003*** 0.0240*** -0.0385*** -0.0351*** 0.1070*** 0.0766*** 0.0934*** 0.0489*** 
(20) roa 0.0220*** -0.1004*** -0.0989*** -0.2259*** -0.0952*** 0.0041 -0.1525*** -0.0970*** 0.1828*** 0.1308*** 0.1598*** -0.0081 
(21) capex -0.0774*** 0.0450*** -0.1162*** -0.2018*** -0.1513*** 0.0671*** -0.0744*** -0.0848*** 0.0292*** 0.0377*** 0.0087 -0.1316*** 
(22) firmage 0.0832*** -0.1137*** -0.1074*** -0.0801*** -0.1014*** 0.0585*** -0.0852*** -0.1808*** 0.1312*** 0.1342*** 0.0743*** 0.3735*** 
(23) beta 0.0271*** 0.0435*** 0.1388*** 0.1628*** 0.1707*** -0.1168*** 0.1030*** 0.1767*** -0.0364*** -0.0282*** -0.0297*** -0.0602*** 
(24) ivol -0.0339*** 0.1650*** -0.0033 0.1187*** -0.0262*** 0.0414*** 0.0042 0.0623*** -0.1557*** -0.0923*** -0.1551*** -0.4202*** 
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  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
(13) female 1.0000            
(14) age -0.0430*** 1.0000           
(15) tenure -0.0511*** 0.3603*** 1.0000          
(16) cash 0.0219*** -0.1310*** -0.0510*** 1.0000         
(17) leverage -0.0272*** 0.0410*** -0.0228*** -0.4088*** 1.0000        
(18) mvbv -0.0010 -0.0080 -0.0001 0.0140** 0.0429*** 1.0000       
(19) ma -0.0144*** -0.0136** -0.0073 -0.0735*** 0.0375*** -0.0049 1.0000      
 (20) roa 0.0114** 0.0285*** 0.0911*** -0.1226*** -0.0332*** 0.0265*** 0.0992*** 1.0000     
(21) capex 0.0004 -0.0225*** 0.0428*** -0.1249*** 0.0311*** 0.0043 -0.0849*** 0.2528*** 1.0000    
(22) firmage 0.0177*** 0.1437*** 0.0923*** -0.2210*** 0.1229*** 0.0011 0.0303*** 0.0497*** 0.0019 1.0000   
(23) beta -0.0068 -0.0580*** -0.0449*** 0.2178*** -0.0824*** 0.0038 -0.0179*** -0.1218*** -0.0074 -0.1227*** 1.0000  
(24) ivol 0.0033 -0.1450*** -0.0972*** 0.2740*** -0.0890*** 0.0073 -0.0832*** -0.2390*** 0.0811*** -0.2908*** 0.3415*** 1 
              
 





4.1.2 Univariate Analysis Results  
Table 4.1.2.1 presents the univariate analysis results of the association between the dependent 
variables, the tones used in annual reports by the CEOs, and the overconfidence variables. Firstly, 
I create two panels based on how overconfidence is measured. For the first panel, I consider 
overconfidence measured by confident67 variable; and for the second panel, I take overconfidence 
as measured by optdelay.  I divide the panel based on whether the CEO is overconfident or not. I 
then proceed to calculate the mean along with a few other descriptive statistics. For each pair of 
overconfident and not-overconfident CEOs for each of the dependent variables, I calculate the 
difference in mean and approach to show if the means are significantly different from each other 
or not by using t-tests. A significantly different means will tell us if overconfidence can solely be 
responsible for explaining the dependent variable or not.  
As I see from the t-values, confident67 cannot explain positive tones in the annual reports, while 
optdelay can, in a statistically significant manner. But both the overconfidence measures can 
explain the use of strong and moderate tones in the annual reports by the overconfident CEOs since 
the means are significantly different between overconfident and not-overconfident CEOs. Both 
confident67 and optdelay can solely impact the negative tones in the 10-K filings in a statistically 
significant manner. But, while confident67 can impact uncertain tone significantly, optdelay 
cannot.  When it comes to litigious tones, I see, confident67 as an explanatory variable can explain 
the dependent variable, while optdelay fails to explain the dependent variable. Again, in the case 
of constraining and weak tones, both confident67 and optdelay have the explanatory power to 
explain or have the power to impact the dependent variable solely.  
 
Table 4.1.2.1: Univariate Analysis Results 
This table presents the univariate analysis results of the primary dependent and primary independent variables. I take the dependent variables and 
see in turns how the two major overconfidence variables impact the dependent variables. I segregate the observations based on whether or not the 



















































































































Yes    16,613  0.1846 0.6368 0.0025 1.2400 0.2149 Yes    16,051  0.1752 -0.0024 0.0132 6.6580 0.0000 
No    16,397  0.1747 0.6344 
  
  No    16,959  0.1717 -0.0146 
   
strong 
Yes    16,613  0.1085 0.2675 -0.0129 -11.2900 0.0000 Yes    16,051  0.1028 0.0007 -0.0092 -8.0260 0.0000 
No    16,397  0.0996 0.2804 
  
  No    16,959  0.1026 0.0107 
   
moderate 
Yes    16,613  0.0806 0.2657 -0.0214 -23.7470 0.0000 Yes    16,051  0.0690 -0.0088 -0.0052 -5.7540 0.0000 
No    16,397  0.0835 0.2871 
  
  No    16,959  0.0706 -0.0035 
   
negative 
Yes    16,613  0.4434 1.5326 -0.1167 -23.8470 0.0000 Yes    16,051  0.3702 -0.0446 -0.0680 -13.8080 0.0000 
No    16,397  0.4457 1.6493 
  
  No    16,959  0.3816 0.0292 
   
uncertain 
Yes    16,613  0.3241 1.1601 -0.0978 -26.2180 0.0000 Yes    16,051  0.2610 -0.0387 -0.0021 -0.5490 0.5827 
No    16,397  0.3533 1.2580 
  
  No    16,959  0.2607 -0.0372 
   
litigious 
Yes    16,613  0.8736 1.7362 0.1282 13.4130 0.0000 Yes    16,051  0.7923 0.1569 0.0140 1.4630 0.1434 
No    16,397  0.8630 1.6079 
  
  No    16,959  0.7983 0.1448 
   
constraining 
Yes    16,613  0.1941 0.7072 -0.0515 -24.1530 0.0000 Yes    16,051  0.1767 0.0128 -0.0219 -10.2040 0.0000 
No    16,397  0.1930 0.7587 
  
  No    16,959  0.1758 0.0355 
   
weak 
Yes    16,613  0.1599 0.4540 -0.0681 -35.3760 0.0000 Yes    16,051  0.1410 -0.0200 -0.0079 -4.0290 0.0001 
No    16,397  0.1890 0.5221 
  
  No    16,959  0.1420 -0.0116 




4.2 Multivariate Analysis Results 
Table 4.2.1 shows the regression results of the dependent variables on the overconfidence variable 
and other control variables. For the main results, I use overconfidence as the overconfidence 
variable, which is the 1st principal component of confident67 and optdelay, the main 
overconfidence variables, following Aghazadeh, Sun, Wang & Yang (2018). I run a fixed-effects 
regression model of the tones in the annual report on CEO overconfidence and other CEO 
characteristics and firm characteristics control variables. I use cluster robust standard error since I 
cannot possibly assume homoskedasticity. Thus, I run eight (8) regressions with eight (8) 
dependent variables. I control for firm and year fixed effects.  
In the regression of strong on overconfidence and other control variables, I find the coefficient to 
bear a negative relationship with the dependent variable similar to what was expected from the 
univariate test results, and the association is statistically significant as well. As a result, I conclude 
that overconfident CEOs do not prefer to use a strong tone in comparison to the extent non-
overconfident CEOs do. I also find that firms with higher capital expenditure and higher firm-
specific risk use more strong words in their annual reports.  
The result could seem a little counter-intuitive at first since overconfident CEOs natural traits go 
in line with showing the strength of their companies’ prospects in the annual reports. But Druz et 
al. (2015) explain from the perspective of analyst perception why it could be opposite in reality. 
Analysts get confused on how to forecast based on the use of more strong modal words in annual 
reports. It puts them in a situation where one analyst interprets the tone in one way while the other 
interprets it in a different way. When the market participants observe that a misaligned analyst 
perception regarding a company, they get confused as well and eventually end up penalizing the 
firm with a negative reaction. Apart from that, according to Bakarich et al. (2017), a firm entering 
its declining stage shows some extent of ambiguity and confidence at the same time with the use 
of a more negative, uncertain, weak and strong tone. 
The univariate test results lead us to direct that overconfident CEOs might tend to avoid a negative 
tone in their annual reports. From the regression of negative tone on overconfidence and other 
variables, I see a statistically significant negative relationship between negative tone and CEO 
overconfidence, which supports the direction from univariate test results. While testing, I found 
that female CEOs tend to use more positive words. The result from this test of hypothesis also 
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supports the previous finding that female CEOs tend to avoid negative tone. Additionally, CEOs 
with a longer tenure in a company tend to avoid using a negative tone in their 10-K filings. Firms 
with lower levels of merger activity, a lower level of capital expenditure, and a lower level of return 
of assets avoid negative wordings in their annual reports as well. Interestingly, I find that firms 
with more leverage, more cash level, more age, and more idiosyncratic risk, i.e., firm-specific risk, 
tend to use a negative tone.  
Prior literature clearly states that a negative tone impacts the market reaction in a negative manner. 
Sell-side analysts seem to correct their forecasts downward while they encounter a negative tone. 
The same finding from Bakarich et al. (2017) stands true here as well that a firm in its declining 
phase tends to exhibit a more negative tone and to reflect upside growth prospects, CEOs will 
prefer to avoid such tone. Lopatta et al. (2014) found that firms that have more negative words in 
their 10-K filing have a significantly higher probability of violating FCPA, 1977.  
At 10% level of significance, I can say that overconfident CEOs tend to avoid a litigious tone. This 
finding does not support the expectation as the expected sign on the coefficient that they will do 
so.  I also find the size of the firm, the tenure a CEO is working with the company, cash level, firm 
age, and capital expenditure statistically significant. The results show that the bigger a firm is, the 
likelier it is to use litigious words in its annual report. And the longer a CEO is working with the 
firm, the higher the chance is (s)he is likely not to use a litigious tone while filing the annual report.  
Firms with higher capital expenditure as well as lower cash levels and lower firm age tend to favor 
a litigious tone. This result strengthens to 95% confidence level in the robustness check using 
optdelay as the measure of overconfidence. 
Same as negative tone, a firm bearing more litigious words in their annual report has a higher 
probability of violating FCPA, 1977, according to Lopatta et al. (2014). Also, litigious words harm 
a firm’s reputation in the market. (Barakat et al., 2019) For the rest of the dependent variables, i.e. 
annual report tones, I could not find any statistical significance to be able to conclude on those. 
 
Table 4.2.1: Multivariate Analysis Results 
This table presents the multivariate analysis results of the primary dependent and all the independent variables in a regression setup. I run fixed 
effects regression model with cluster robust standard error of eight (8) different tones used in annual reports by the CEOs on overconfidence (as 
measured by overconfidence, the 1st principal component of confident67 and optdelay) and other control variables. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES netpositive strong moderate negative uncertain lit igious constraining weak 
                  
overconfidence -0.0006 -0.0026*** 0.0000 -0.0211*** 0.0030 -0.0136* -0.0011 0.0005 
 (-0.400) (-2.833) (0.008) (-6.233) (1.326) (-1.897) (-0.749) (0.417) 
logassets -0.0110*** -0.0033* -0.0063*** -0.0102 0.0131*** 0.0475*** -0.0098*** 0.0095*** 
 (-3.138) (-1.784) (-4.618) (-1.296) (2.636) (2.957) (-2.859) (3.280) 
female 0.0253** 0.0063 -0.0036 -0.0634** 0.0043 -0.0586 0.0036 0.0058 
 (2.066) (0.797) (-0.891) (-2.317) (0.286) (-1.292) (0.351) (0.551) 
age -0.0009*** -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 (-3.355) (-1.196) (0.398) (0.076) (-0.539) (0.397) (-1.065) (-0.467) 
tenure 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0016*** 0.0003 -0.0026*** -0.0005** 0.0001 
 (1.335) (-1.290) (1.312) (-3.103) (0.856) (-2.661) (-2.506) (0.777) 
cash 0.0409*** 0.0131* 0.0204*** 0.0747** 0.0318 -0.1350** -0.0467*** 0.0440*** 
 (2.964) (1.710) (3.399) (2.260) (1.526) (-2.038) (-3.346) (3.564) 
leverage -0.0387*** -0.0027 -0.0226*** 0.0696** -0.0343* 0.0873 0.0791*** 0.0050 
 (-2.970) (-0.373) (-4.180) (2.293) (-1.751) (1.359) (5.937) (0.485) 
mvbv -0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000*** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 (-2.699) (-0.038) (-1.359) (0.533) (-2.847) (1.424) (0.385) (1.157) 
ma -0.0058** -0.0018 -0.0034*** -0.0302*** -0.0032 0.0127 -0.0048* -0.0076*** 
 (-2.442) (-1.240) (-3.719) (-5.833) (-0.901) (1.071) (-1.953) (-4.199) 
roa 0.0530*** -0.0131 0.0104 -0.3185*** 0.0045 -0.0745 -0.0733*** -0.0072 
 (3.481) (-1.300) (1.381) (-6.711) (0.159) (-0.956) (-4.799) (-0.436) 
capex -0.0591* 0.0535** -0.0070 -0.2621*** -0.0342 0.4255** 0.0190 0.0014 
 (-1.672) (2.255) (-0.466) (-3.024) (-0.654) (2.103) (0.437) (0.051) 
firmage 0.0049*** 0.0003 0.0054*** 0.0279*** 0.0264*** -0.0326*** 0.0108*** 0.0093*** 
 (7.228) (0.896) (24.247) (20.644) (31.918) (-10.720) (16.811) (18.349) 
beta 0.0014 0.0003 0.0016* 0.0050 0.0103*** -0.0095 0.0021 0.0050*** 
 (0.725) (0.246) (1.911) (1.164) (3.419) (-0.907) (1.057) (3.393) 
ivol -0.0667 0.0969*** 0.0178 1.0751*** -0.1186 0.2295 0.2236*** -0.0618 
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 (-1.393) (2.900) (0.798) (7.606) (-1.362) (0.786) (3.683) (-1.577) 
Constant  0.6463*** 0.2917*** 0.1836*** 0.9610*** 0.4515*** 2.0763*** 0.5620*** 0.2219*** 
 (21.370) (17.301) (16.904) (14.730) (11.355) (14.636) (18.356) (9.488) 
         
Firm Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 
Number of  
 
gvkey_n 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 
 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.031 0.010 0.245 0.265 0.370 0.093 0.153 0.290 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 





However, endogeneity issues may exist in the result. Because, personal traits that can be observed, 
such as – employment history or ethnicity, could be responsible for the recruitment of the CEOs. 
Also, the Board of Directors may take into account the overconfident nature of the CEO while 
appointing her/him, although the board should also be aware of the negative impacts of 
overconfidence on investment and such. I try to alleviate the issue with observed CEO-specific 
omitted variables or firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity by controlling for year and firm fixed 
effects, and by adding measurable CEO and firm characteristics in the control variable to some 
extent. 
To begin discussing and explaining the findings, I restate that the results might seem a little 
counterintuitive since overconfident CEOs are supposed to appear strong and extremely positive, 
highly optimistic in their tones in the annual reports. Studying previous literature, I generally state 
a few perspectives why overconfident CEOs would advocate moderation in their tones instead from 
the perspectives of capital budgeting, cost of capital, market reaction, firm value, attractiveness to 
M&A target, and investors, misstatement and restatement cost.  
The results somewhat support what Aghazadeh et al. (2018) mentioned – that the overall effect of 
CEO overconfidence is optimal when the level of overconfidence is moderate since the benefits of 
overconfidence erode when the level is in the extremes. I find that overconfident CEOs do not 
favor a strong tone. They also maintain avoiding negative tone while avoiding the use of an extreme 
positive tone. They avoid using litigious tone as they might convey an extremely unfavorable 
impression of the condition of the firm.  
Malmendier & Tate (2005) argue that overconfident CEOs prioritize internal funds, but when it 
comes to external funds, they prefer debt to equity. Several studies found a higher cost of debt to 
be associated with CEO overconfidence, although there’s contrasting evidence. Bondholders have 
been seen to put forward more restrictive debt covenants for overconfident CEOs to limit their 
investing, merger, and refinancing activities. These restrictions loosen up when the CEOs can 
provide superior prior performance, transparency in financial reports and higher delivered 
profitability. As a result, being overconfident CEOs who prefer debt, they have the incentive to 
tame down their level of overconfidence and mirror a moderate level of overconfidence. 
According to Malmendier & Tate (2005), overconfidence is more important for an equity-
dependent firm. Since Aghazadeh et al. (2018) show that a moderate level of overconfidence results 
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in the lowest cost of equity, exercising such moderation is in the best interest of overconfident 
CEOs while it comes to the cost of capital. Because a lower cost of capital leads to higher firm 
value and overconfident CEOs have more unexercised exercisable options tied to the firm value, 
as a rational CEO, it is in their best interest to portray a moderate level of overconfidence.  
Prior studies have found a negative correlation between market reaction and CEO overconfidence. 
The market participants react more negatively to the merger announcements and annual reports of 
the firms headed by overconfident CEOs. Sell-side analysts have been found to tame down their 
forecasts if they see a negative tone. Overconfident CEOs will be able to draw more targets and 
investors for M&A through a positive market reaction toward their firms. 
Studies have shown the possibility of overconfident CEOs to be more involved in financial 
misstatements. The argument behind is that overconfident CEOs tend to have an optimistic bias in 
their forecasts, which may not be intentional in the beginning and may not meet the legal standard 
of financial fraud. But, if they fail to meet their forecasts in subsequent performance, they might 
be in a position where they then intentionally start misstating financial reports being in the pressure 
of meeting the expectation. They may derive some short-term benefits from these misstatements. 
But such behavior puts those CEOs at odds with long-term bond and stockholders. Restatement 
costs have been seen to soar up to $100 billion alongside degraded public confidence. Exercising 
moderation in their overconfidence, overconfident CEOs have avoided such a dilemma in the very 
first place. 
As Druz et al. (2015) mention, when a firm uses a more strong tone, the analysts become perplexed 
with how to interpret such tone resulting in disparity in their forecasts. The market, consequently, 
gets confused and ends up reacting negatively despite the confidence overconfident CEOs reflect 
via strong modal verbs in their annual reports. Notwithstanding, a firm entering its declining phase 
reveals ambiguity and confidence by using more negative, uncertain, weak and strong tones 
(Bakarich et al., 2017). To signal the market regarding the potential upside growth, an 
overconfident CEO thus has the incentive to avoid negative and strong tone in their 10-K filings. 
Lopatta et al. (2014) find evidence of the violation of FCPA (1977) within firms that use more 
negative and litigious tone. In a nutshell, by avoiding negative, strong as well as litigious tone in 
their annual reports, overconfident CEOs can be in a favorable position as opposed to appearing 
highly overconfident. And since the impact of tones of the information managers reveal matters 
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more when the CEO is overconfidence as stated by Merrienboer (2016), overconfident CEOs have 
more incentive to avoid negative, litigious , and strong tone in contrast to their non-overconfident 
counterparts, as evident from the results I get.  
 
4.3 Alternative Explanations 
Next I ask whether the sensitivity of negative, strong and litigious tones to CEO overconfidence is 
heterogeneous across the higher and lower level of a particular CEO or firm characteristic. For this 
analysis, I divide the sample into two groups at median by respective characteristics used as control 
variables and examine if the sensitivity of CEO overconfidence to negative, strong and litigious 
tones varies across these sub-samples. I observe the coefficients of the interaction between 
overconfidence and the variable based on which the sample is divided to shed light on possible 
drivers of annual report tone–CEO overconfidence sensitivity. 
First, Malmendier, Tate & Yan (2011) argue that various quantifiable traits of a CEO can influence 
corporate decision making and bear explanatory power, especially when it relates to 
overconfidence. According to Malmendier & Nagel (2011), an older CEO, because of her/his 
experience, might be more overconfident. Also, experience can be measured with tenure, especially 
for industry-specific experience (Cremers & Grinstein, 2009). This is why, I divide my sample into 
two (2) groups respectively at the median of these CEO-specific control variables whether or not 
they are higher or lower than the median and then run fixed effects regression model with year and 
firm fixed effects along with the control variables included in the main model with cluster-robust 
standard error. 
I also divide the sample based on firm-specific control variables, such as – firm size (logassets), 
cash, leverage, market to book value, age of CEOs, merger occurrences, ROA, capital expenditure, 
firm’s age, beta and idiosyncratic volatility as well. Except for mergers, other variables are 
categorized as a dummy variable based on whether the value of classifying the control variable is 
higher (=1) or lower (=0) than the median in the dataset. Since the merger variable is a dummy, I 
segregate the sample based on whether there has been any merger activity or not contingent upon 




Table 4.3.1: Analysis of Negative Tone–CEO Overconfidence sensitivity to CEO- and firm-
specific control variables 
This table presents the multivariate analysis results of the dependent variable, negative tone, and all the 
independent variables in a regression setup. I run fixed effects regression model with cluster robust standard 
error of negative tone used in annual reports by the CEOs on overconfidence (as measured by 
overconfidence) and the interaction between overconfidence and the variable based on different CEO- and 
firm-specific control variables included in the primary research model, based on whether these variables are 
higher or lower than the sample median. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



















-0.0002 0.0031 -0.0048 0.0076 0.0037 0.0077 
(-0.037) (0.580) (-0.968) (1.487) (0.824) (1.557) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 
Number of gvkey_n 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 
Adjusted R-squared 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.268 0.265 
       
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 































(0.876) (1.850) (0.199) (-1.332) (0.457) (-0.223) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 
Number of gvkey_n 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 
Adjusted R-squared 0.267 0.266 0.265 0.265 0.266 0.265 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
In Table 4.3.1, I present the variation in sensitivity of negative tone to CEO overconfidence across 
various CEO and firm characteristics. In Column 8, the result suggests that the negative tone–CEO 
overconfidence sensitivity of firms headed by overconfident CEOs with higher capital expenditure 




Table 4.3.2: Analysis of Strong Tone–CEO Overconfidence sensitivity to CEO- and firm-specific 
control variables 
This table presents the multivariate analysis results of the dependent variable, strong tone, and all the 
independent variables in a regression setup. I run fixed effects regression model with cluster robust standard 
error of strong tone used in annual reports by the CEOs on overconfidence (as measured by overconfidence) 
and the interaction between overconfidence and the variable based on different CEO- and firm-specific 
control variables included in the primary research model, based on whether these variables are higher or 
lower than the sample median. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















 (-1.489) (-1.668) (-3.255) (-1.686) (-1.901) (-1.835) 
Interaction between 














(-1.087) (-1.553) (1.981) (-1.035) (-0.572) (-0.937) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 
Number of gvkey_n 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 
Adjusted R-squared 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 
       
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 















 (-1.768) (-2.291) (-2.474) (-2.576) (-2.419) (-1.718) 
Interaction between  
overconfidence and sub- 
sampling variable 
-0.0011 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0016 
(-0.841) (-0.228) (0.498) (0.595) (0.179) (-1.352) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 
Number of gvkey_n 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 
Adjusted R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
In Table 4.3.2, I present the variation in sensitivity of strong tone to CEO overconfidence across 
different CEO and firm characteristics. In Column 3, the result suggests that the level of cash a 
firm holds seems to drive the strong tone–CEO overconfidence sensitivity and firms headed by 
overconfident CEOs with higher levels of cash tend to increase the use of strong tone in annual 




Table 4.3.3: Analysis of Litigious Tone–CEO Overconfidence sensitivity to CEO- and firm-
specific control variables 
This table presents the multivariate analysis results of the dependent variable, litigious tone, and all the 
independent variables in a regression setup. I run fixed effects regression model with cluster robust standard 
error of litigious tone used in annual reports by the CEOs on overconfidence (as measured by 
overconfidence) and the interaction between overconfidence and the variable based on different CEO- and 
firm-specific control variables included in the primary research model, based on whether these variables are 
higher or lower than the sample median. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















 (-1.169) (-2.190) (-1.743) (-0.359) (0.081) (-2.435) 
Interaction between  














(-0.391) (1.059) (0.391) (-1.843) (-2.199) (1.593) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 
Number of gvkey_n 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 
Adjusted R-squared 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.094 0.093 
       
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 














 (-1.166) (-1.119) (-2.020) (-1.467) (-2.259) (-1.516) 
Interaction between  
overconfidence and sub- 
sampling variable 
-0.0048 -0.0058 0.0107 -0.0021 0.0105 -0.0018 
(-0.449) (-0.544) (0.877) (-0.244) (1.152) (-0.180) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 
Number of gvkey_n 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 
Adjusted R-squared 0.093 0.094 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
In Table 4.3.3, I present the variation in sensitivity of litigious tone to CEO overconfidence across 
several CEO and firm characteristics. In Column 4, the result suggests that leverage seems to drive  
the litigious tone–CEO overconfidence sensitivity and firms headed by overconfident CEOs with 
higher leverage tend to reduce the use of litigious tone in annual reports by 2.00% at 90% 
confidence level.  In Column 5, result suggests that the market to book value also seems to drive 
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the sensitivity of litigious tone to overconfidence. More valued firms headed by overconfident 
CEOs tend to decrease the use of litigious tone in annual reports by 2.26%.  
In short, I find strong evidence of firms headed by overconfident CEOs with higher levels of cash 
increasing the use of strong tone in annual reports, and more valued firms (measured by market to 
book value increasing the use of litigious tone. I also find weak evidence of firms headed by 
overconfident CEOs with higher capital expenditure increasing the use of negative tone and highly 
leveraged firms headed by overconfident CEOs decreasing the use of litigious tone. 
 
4.4 Robustness Test Results 
I begin designing the research model as compact as possible from the very first go by adding a 
substantial number of control variables and also using year and firm fixed effects. Since Aghazadeh 
et al. (2018) argue that no overconfidence measure is better than the other, I capture the variance 
between two different measures of overconfidence; I introduce the 1st principal component of those 
two in the model, to begin with.  
Some questions might be raised to question the validity of principal component factor analysis as 
well. For example, it deals only with large variances, and in the process, compresses noise in the 
dataset. Secondly, results obtained from principal component factor analysis can be scale-variant. 
Changing the scales can affect the results. This is why, to show that the results hold in different 
circumstances as well, I check the robustness of the results by taking the overconfidence measures 
I considered individually. 
For the robustness check, I firstly take this approach – I try to run the same regression model as I 
have done for the main result, with the exception of the choice of overconfidence variable. First, I 
take optdelay as the measure of overconfidence, and then I use confident67 as the overconfidence 
measure. I try to see if the results hold. 
 
Table 4.4.1: Robustness Check 1 – Regression on optdelay 
This table presents the multivariate analysis results of the primary dependent and all the independent variables in a regression setup. I run fixed 
effects regression model with cluster robust standard error of eight (8) different tones used in annual reports by the CEOs on overconfidence (as 
measured by optdelay) and other control variables. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES netpositive strong moderate negative uncertain lit igious constraining weak 
                  
optdelay 0.0012 -0.0035** 0.0002 -0.0404*** 0.0059 -0.0305*** -0.0019 -0.0006 
 (0.502) (-2.363) (0.172) (-7.189) (1.530) (-2.599) (-0.792) (-0.298) 
logassets -0.0111*** -0.0033* -0.0063*** -0.0095 0.0130*** 0.0482*** -0.0097*** 0.0095*** 
 (-3.171) (-1.781) (-4.618) (-1.206) (2.609) (2.998) (-2.853) (3.296) 
female 0.0256** 0.0069 -0.0036 -0.0598** 0.0038 -0.0566 0.0038 0.0056 
 (2.092) (0.877) (-0.888) (-2.184) (0.253) (-1.251) (0.371) (0.531) 
age -0.0009*** -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 (-3.382) (-1.347) (0.399) (-0.215) (-0.471) (0.302) (-1.106) (-0.449) 
tenure 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0017*** 0.0003 -0.0027*** -0.0005** 0.0001 
 (1.281) (-1.490) (1.310) (-3.387) (0.922) (-2.750) (-2.552) (0.830) 
cash 0.0406*** 0.0131* 0.0204*** 0.0768** 0.0315 -0.1330** -0.0466*** 0.0441*** 
 (2.943) (1.711) (3.397) (2.324) (1.510) (-2.006) (-3.340) (3.576) 
leverage -0.0383*** -0.0024 -0.0225*** 0.0699** -0.0343* 0.0868 0.0791*** 0.0048 
 (-2.945) (-0.340) (-4.175) (2.309) (-1.753) (1.353) (5.936) (0.466) 
mvbv -0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000*** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 (-2.740) (-0.062) (-1.363) (0.556) (-2.861) (1.441) (0.385) (1.191) 
ma -0.0059** -0.0019 -0.0034*** -0.0303*** -0.0032 0.0128 -0.0048* -0.0076*** 
 (-2.482) (-1.283) (-3.724) (-5.862) (-0.897) (1.079) (-1.957) (-4.166) 
roa 0.0515*** -0.0137 0.0103 -0.3155*** 0.0040 -0.0697 -0.0733*** -0.0063 
 (3.398) (-1.366) (1.369) (-6.669) (0.142) (-0.891) (-4.789) (-0.379) 
capex -0.0601* 0.0532** -0.0071 -0.2584*** -0.0348 0.4299** 0.0191 0.0021 
 (-1.697) (2.241) (-0.471) (-2.979) (-0.664) (2.127) (0.439) (0.073) 
firmage 0.0049*** 0.0004 0.0054*** 0.0280*** 0.0264*** -0.0325*** 0.0108*** 0.0093*** 
 (7.221) (0.929) (24.257) (20.780) (31.889) (-10.687) (16.821) (18.344) 
beta 0.0014 0.0003 0.0016* 0.0049 0.0103*** -0.0096 0.0021 0.0050*** 
 (0.720) (0.225) (1.911) (1.123) (3.427) (-0.918) (1.053) (3.396) 
ivol -0.0638 0.0981*** 0.0180 1.0697*** -0.1177 0.2206 0.2235*** -0.0636 
 (-1.331) (2.945) (0.808) (7.605) (-1.353) (0.755) (3.684) (-1.618) 
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Constant  0.6474*** 0.2952*** 0.1836*** 0.9872*** 0.4477*** 2.0926*** 0.5634*** 0.2211*** 
 (21.583) (17.642) (16.954) (15.252) (11.291) (14.822) (18.498) (9.472) 
         
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 
Number of gvkey_n 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 
Adjusted R-squared 0.031 0.010 0.245 0.265 0.370 0.093 0.153 0.290 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses        
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Table 4.4.2: Robustness Check 2 – Regression on confident67 
This table presents the multivariate analysis results of the primary dependent and all the independent variables in a regression setup. I run fixed 
effects regression model with cluster robust standard error of eight (8) different tones used in annual reports by the CEOs on overconfidence (as 
measured by confident67) and other control variables. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES netpositive strong moderate negative uncertain litigious constraining weak 
                  
confident67 -0.0053 -0.0056** -0.0003 -0.0210** 0.0028 -0.0050 -0.0014 0.0034 
 (-1.240) (-2.093) (-0.186) (-2.158) (0.452) (-0.248) (-0.336) (1.001) 
logassets -0.0110*** -0.0035* -0.0063*** -0.0117 0.0134*** 0.0465*** -0.0099*** 0.0095*** 
 (-3.160) (-1.900) (-4.624) (-1.495) (2.676) (2.899) (-2.886) (3.295) 
female 0.0247** 0.0063 -0.0037 -0.0596** 0.0038 -0.0548 0.0037 0.0061 
 (2.012) (0.798) (-0.903) (-2.158) (0.248) (-1.202) (0.366) (0.587) 
age -0.0009*** -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 (-3.237) (-1.108) (0.415) (-0.002) (-0.516) (0.327) (-1.057) (-0.547) 
tenure 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0018*** 0.0003 -0.0028*** -0.0005** 0.0001 
 (1.434) (-1.318) (1.335) (-3.424) (0.938) (-2.827) (-2.543) (0.699) 
cash 0.0407*** 0.0125 0.0204*** 0.0701** 0.0325 -0.1379** -0.0469*** 0.0441*** 
 (2.949) (1.628) (3.400) (2.118) (1.554) (-2.077) (-3.365) (3.578) 
leverage -0.0388*** -0.0023 -0.0226*** 0.0741** -0.0349* 0.0906 0.0793*** 0.0050 
 (-2.984) (-0.318) (-4.189) (2.438) (-1.787) (1.413) (5.957) (0.491) 
mvbv -0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000*** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 (-2.701) (-0.126) (-1.357) (0.399) (-2.784) (1.381) (0.377) (1.160) 
ma -0.0058** -0.0019 -0.0034*** -0.0313*** -0.0030 0.0119 -0.0049** -0.0076*** 
 (-2.421) (-1.305) (-3.714) (-6.036) (-0.854) (0.999) (-1.978) (-4.210) 
roa 0.0531*** -0.0153 0.0104 -0.3400*** 0.0076 -0.0897 -0.0744*** -0.0072 
 (3.484) (-1.523) (1.392) (-7.032) (0.273) (-1.157) (-4.878) (-0.435) 
capex -0.0593* 0.0518** -0.0070 -0.2763*** -0.0322 0.4160** 0.0183 0.0016 
 (-1.679) (2.185) (-0.465) (-3.188) (-0.614) (2.056) (0.420) (0.059) 
firmage 0.0049*** 0.0003 0.0054*** 0.0278*** 0.0264*** -0.0326*** 0.0108*** 0.0093*** 
 (7.210) (0.856) (24.224) (20.618) (31.934) (-10.710) (16.783) (18.380) 
beta 0.0015 0.0003 0.0016* 0.0049 0.0103*** -0.0097 0.0021 0.0050*** 
 (0.739) (0.250) (1.914) (1.135) (3.425) (-0.920) (1.055) (3.382) 
ivol -0.0668 0.1010*** 0.0177 1.1149*** -0.1243 0.2575 0.2255*** -0.0619 
 (-1.398) (3.032) (0.796) (7.835) (-1.432) (0.882) (3.723) (-1.586) 
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Constant 0.6475*** 0.2960*** 0.1836*** 0.9944*** 0.4467*** 2.0974*** 0.5638*** 0.2210*** 
 (21.617) (17.710) (16.954) (15.319) (11.258) (14.861) (18.518) (9.462) 
         
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 31,069 
Number of gvkey_n 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 3,088 
Adjusted R-squared 0.031 0.010 0.245 0.263 0.370 0.093 0.153 0.290 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses        




Looking at Table 4.3.1 where I regress the dependent variables on optdelay instead of 
overconfidence or optdelay, I see some change. When I use overconfidence as the measure of 
overconfidence, I find the relationship between overconfidence and a strong and negative tone to 
be significant. I also find a litigious tone to be significant at 90% level of confidence. When I use 
optdelay, the results strengthen. Besides getting strong and negative tone to be statistically 
significant, I also get the litigious tone to be statistically significant now at 5% level of significance.  
From Table 4.3.2 where I regress the dependent variables on confident67 and other control 
variables, I see that the significant results I got for the two (2) dependent variables – strong tone 
and negative tone, at 5% level of significance, hold. There is no change in the sign on the 
coefficients. None of these two (2) regression setups could explain the association of 
overconfidence among CEOs with a positive tone, moderate tone, uncertain tone, constraining tone , 
and weak tone.  
From the regression setup and the results, I can say overconfidence as the measure of 
overconfidence takes on a greater weight from optdelay and explains more, but not less, the same 
dependent variables, whereas confident67 explains the same two dependent variables that both 






The objective of this research is to find out whether firms headed by overconfident CEOs favor or 
avoid certain tones while filing the annual reports of their respective firms. My sample ranges from 
1993 to 2016, consisting of 3,088 panels with 6,213 CEOs over which I run fixed effects regression 
of different tones on CEO overconfidence with cluster robust standard error controlling for year 
and firm fixed effects including several other CEO characteristics and firm characteristic control 
variables.  
 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
From the results, I find strong evidence that firms headed by overconfident CEOs tend to avoid 
strong and negative tone in their annual report. While I regress using the overconfidence measure 
where CEOs hold more unexercised exercisable options than the industry median, I find that, apart 
from strong and negative tones, their firms also tend to avoid litigious tone (at 5% level of 
significance). When I proceed to regress using the overconfidence measure where CEOs do not 
exercise their options even when they are 67% in-the-money during the fifth year and onwards, I 
see that the firms headed by overconfident CEOs avoid using a negative and strong tone in their 
annual reports, same as the initial result.  
Overconfident CEOs tend to get involved in more mergers and acquisitions. Because the investors 
react negatively to the merger announcements made by overconfident CEOs, it is in their best 
interest to reflect moderation. Also, by avoiding negative tone, they can create a positive reaction 
in the market. Since overconfident CEOs are more active in the M&A market, they can attract more 
targets by virtue of a positive environment. Sell-side analysts revise their forecast downward if 
there is a negative tone portrayed. Also, negative tone affects the firm reputation and has a higher 
probability of violating FCPA, 1977. A firm about to enter its declining stage, try to appear more 
ambiguous and more confident by using a more negative, uncertain, more strong and weaker tone. 
This undermines the growth prospect of their firms overconfident CEOs believe in. So, it is in the 
best interest of overconfident CEOs to avoid using a negative tone. Why would firms led by 
overconfident CEOs avoid a negative tone and not favor a positive tone instead? The reason is, 
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Druz (2015) shows that the positive effect of avoiding negative tone is larger than the effect of 
favoring a positive tone.  
It may come surprising that overconfident CEOs will avoid strong tone as they are confident by 
nature. But literature show that when they use a more strong tone, the analysts get confused about 
how to interpret the tones and thus their predictions vary. When there is variation among the 
forecast analysts make, the market also gets confused and penalizes the firm in the process. So 
even avoiding a strong tone is in the best interest of overconfident CEOs. Also, the same as negative 
tone, a firm about to enter its declining stage uses more strong tone in their annual report giving 
the wrong signal contrary to the belief overconfident CEOs hold.  
Previous literature associates litigious tone with stock return volatility. And similarly, as negative 
tone, litigious tone affects the firm reputation and has a higher probability of violating FCPA, 1977.  
Since the impact of tones matters more in case of overconfident CEOs in comparison to non-
overconfident CEOs, overconfident CEOs have more incentive to avoid negative, strong and 
litigious tone in their annual reports. 
I test the sensitivity of negative, strong and litigious tone to CEO overconfidence across high and 
low levels at median of some particular CEO- and firm-specific characteristics. Results show strong 
evidence of firms headed by overconfident CEOs with higher levels of cash increasing the use of 
strong tone in annual reports, and more valued firms (measured by market to book value decreasing 
the use of litigious tone. Results also show weak evidence of firms headed by overconfident CEOs 
with higher capital expenditure increasing the use of negative tone and highly leveraged firms 
headed by overconfident CEOs decreasing the use of litigious tone. 
 
5.2 Limitation, Practical Implication, and Scope for Future Research 
Major limitation of the study comes in terms of potential endogeneity. Since CEO overconfidence 
is a behavioral trait, and to measure overconfidence, my best bet is to use a proxy variable, for 
which in my case, I used an options-based measure coupled with an industry median-based 
measure, there might be endogeneity concerns – that is hard to identify. Endogenous CEO-firm 
matching, as well as CEO characteristics, can potentially make it difficult for us to interpret the 
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results between the tone of annual reports and CEO overconfidence due to observed CEO-specific 
omitted variables and unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. Being aware of these endogeneity 
concerns, I limit the sources of endogeneity to some extent from the very beginning by using 
additional controls for CEO characteristics that may be related to overconfidence in the primary 
model along with some firm-specific control variables. Also, I use year and firm fixed effects to 
counter firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity concerns.  
According to Malmendier & Tate (2005), the results should not be driven by endogeneity issues 
because the stakeholders should be aware of the detrimental effects of overconfidence and take 
resorts to supplemental steps while taking decisions while dealing with overconfident CEOs. And 
from the results, I also see that the results hold while I account for additional CEO characteristic  
variables, and year and firm fixed effects in order to respond to endogeneity issues.   
The findings bear practical implications in the area of corporate and behavioral finance. Textual 
analysis is growingly being used on financial documents and proceedings. Since now, studies have 
looked mostly into positive and negative sentiments the texts incorporate and on their effects on 
market returns. I expand the range of sentiments even more. Also, until now, overconfidence has 
been looked into for its association with basically with corporate finance issues, such as – 
investment decisions, cost of equity, etc. But I try to work with overconfidence from a behavioral 
finance aspect. This is the first study that explains the influence of CEO overconfidence on tone of 
the annual report based on prior literature.  
The research does consider some important aspects of textual analysis on overconfidence. Yet 
further research can be conducted on many other financial documents apart from annual reports. 
Also, overconfidence can be looked at more comprehensively, combining a few other measures. 
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Data Loss Process 
 
 
# of Observations 
Price data  
Deleted missing closing prices 
Options data 
Merged price and options data 
Removed duplicate values 
Execucomp data 
Filtered by annual CEO 
LM data 
Filtered by 10-K 
Merged Execucomp & LM data 
Fog data 
Removed duplicate values 
Merged Execucomp-LM-Fog data 
Compustat data 
Filtered by asset size and deleted missing total asset values 
Merged Execucomp-LM-Fog-Compustat data 
Deleted negative/missing tenure values 
CRSP data 
Kept first year data 
Beta data 
Kept last year 
Merged CRSP & beta data 
Merged Execucomp-LM-Fog-Compustat-CRSP-Beta data 
Deleted negative firmage & mvbv values, and observations from 1992 
Final regression  
440,399 
371,047 
132,620 
216,176 
132,620 
286,016 
45,696 
192,117 
152,938 
37,975 
86,540 
82,448 
37,975 
484,878 
309,812 
37,496 
35,974 
4,521,957 
404,396 
17,391,901 
378,392 
403,388 
34,014 
33,011 
31,069 
 
